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State Capacity and Economic Development:  
A Network Approach†
By Daron Acemoglu, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson*
We study the direct and spillover effects of local state capacity in 
Colombia. We model the determination of state capacity as a net-
work game between municipalities and the national government. 
We estimate this model exploiting the municipality network and the 
roots of local state capacity related to the presence of the colonial 
state and royal roads. Our estimates indicate that local state capac-
ity decisions are strategic complements. Spillover effects are sizable, 
accounting for about 50 percent of the quantitative impact of an 
expansion in local state capacity, but network effects driven by equi-
librium responses of other municipalities are much larger. (JEL D85, 
H41, H77, O17, O18)
Though we often take for granted the existence of central and local states with 
the capacity to enforce law and order, regulate economic activity, and provide pub-
lic goods, many states in less-developed parts of the world lack this capacity. In 
Migdal’s (1988, p. 33) words: “In parts of the Third World, the inability of state lead-
ers to achieve predominance in large areas of their countries has been striking …”
The idea that such state capacity is vital for economic development, though 
latent in the writings of Hobbes and Weber, began to attract more attention as a 
consequence of analyses of the “East Asian Miracle.” A series of books by Johnson 
(1982); Amsden (1989); Wade (1990); and Evans (1995) argued that a key to 
the economic success of East Asian economies was that they all had states with a 
great deal of capacity. Others, such as Herbst (2000) and Centeno (2002), linked 
the economic failure of African or Latin American nations to their limited state 
capacity. This hypothesis also receives support from the cross-country empirical 
evidence presented in Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and the within-country evidence 
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in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Bandyopadhyay and Green (2012), 
which find a positive association between measures of (historical) political central-
ization and present-day outcomes.1
In this paper, we contribute to this literature in several dimensions. We study the 
effect of state capacity of Colombian municipalities on public goods provision and 
prosperity. We conceptualize “state capacity” as the presence of state functionaries 
and agencies. This represents one aspect of what Mann (1986, 1993) calls the “infra-
structural power” of the state (see also Soifer 2008). Colombia provides an ideal 
laboratory for such an investigation for several reasons. There is a wide diversity 
of local state presence, public goods provision, and prosperity across the country, 
and many important aspects of local state capacity in Colombia—including notary 
offices, health centers, health posts, schools, libraries, fire stations, jails, deed reg-
istry offices, tax collection offices, and part of the bureaucracy—are decided at the 
local level. Finally, and critically for our empirical strategy, Colombia’s history of 
colonization provides us with sources of potential exogenous variation in local state 
capacity, which we exploit in order to deal with endogeneity and reverse causality 
concerns and to isolate the impact of state capacity (rather than other social and 
institutional factors). In particular, we focus on the historical presence of colonial 
state officials, colonial state agencies, and the colonial “royal roads” network. The 
road network, for example, was partially based on precolonial indigenous roads and 
was overhauled when the modern system of roads was built in Colombia starting in 
the 1930s. This network has disappeared and thus provides an attractive source of 
variation in the historical presence of the state and the cost of building and expand-
ing local state capacity (especially when we control for distance to current roads). 
We exploit this royal road network, as well as information on the location of various 
colonial state offices and officials, in order to isolate historical sources of variation 
in the cost of building state capacity today.
Our main contribution is that, differently from all of the literature in this area, 
we model the impact of state capacity in one municipality on public goods provi-
sion and economic outcomes in neighboring areas. We expect (and empirically find) 
such neighborhood spillovers to be important both because borders across munici-
palities are porous, and because building a functioning bureaucracy in the midst of 
an area where state capacity is entirely missing is likely to be much more difficult.
Cross-municipality effects also imply that building state capacity is a strategic 
choice for each municipality. If municipalities free-ride on their neighbors’ invest-
ments, state capacity choices will be strategic substitutes. Conversely, if municipali-
ties find it harder or less beneficial to build state capacity when it is missing in their 
neighborhood, they will be strategic complements. Other important reasons for stra-
tegic complementarities include: (i) when there is a functioning state in the neigh-
borhood, voters may be more likely to demand it of their own politicians; (ii) some 
problems, such as defeating criminal organizations or dealing with  contagious 
1 Relatedly, Rauch and Evans (2000); Acemoglu (2005); Besley and Persson (2009, 2011); and Dincecco and 
Katz (forthcoming) document positive correlations between tax to GDP ratio or measures of meritocracy in the 
state bureaucracy and economic development, and Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson (2013) show a positive correla-
tion between political centralization and development using ethnographic data on political centralization from the 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. 
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 diseases, may be beyond the capability of the local state at the municipality level; 
(iii) the judicial system may not function just in a single municipality.
We incorporate these strategic aspects by modeling the building of state capacity 
as a network game in which each municipality takes the national state’s as well as 
their neighbors’ actions into account and chooses its own state capacity. We then 
estimate the parameters of this model, exploiting both the network structure and the 
exogenous sources of variation discussed above. The key parameters concern: (i) the 
impact of own state capacity on own prosperity (and public goods); (ii) spillovers 
on neighbors; and (iii) the parameters of the best response equation concerning how 
state capacity decisions depend on neighbors’ state capacities. In the process, we 
clarify why both empirical approaches that ignore the endogeneity concerns and 
those that do not model the network structure of interactions will lead to potentially 
misleading estimates.
Estimates of the “best response” equations linking a municipality’s state capacity 
to its neighbors’ state capacity indicate that these decisions are strategic comple-
ments. To estimate the effect of own and neighbors’ state capacity on measures of 
public goods provision and prosperity, we use one of three empirical approaches: (i) 
linear instrumental variables (IV) applied to each dimension of prosperity; (ii) gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM); or (iii) simulated method of moments (SMM) 
using all dimensions of prosperity simultaneously. In each case, we clarify how the 
reduced-form parameters map into the structural ones. Our results show large and 
fairly precise effects of both own and neighbors’ state capacity on the measures of 
prosperity and public goods provision.
Our benchmark estimates imply, for example, that moving all municipalities 
below median state capacity to the median will have a “partial equilibrium” direct 
effect (holding the level of state capacity of all municipalities above the median 
constant) of reducing the median poverty rate by  3 percentage points, increasing 
the median coverage rate of public utilities (electricity, aqueduct, and sewage) by 
4 percentage points, and increasing the median secondary school enrollment rate by 
3 percentage points. About  57 percent of these impacts is due to a direct effect, while 
43 percent is due to network spillovers. The “full equilibrium” effect is very dif-
ferent, however. Once we take into account the equilibrium responses to the initial 
changes in local state capacity in the network, the median coverage rate of public 
utilities increases by  10 percentage points, the median fraction of the population 
in poverty falls by  11 percentage points, and median secondary school enrollment 
rates increase by over  26 percentage points. These large impacts, which are entirely 
due to network effects, highlight not only the central role that state capacity plays in 
economic development but also the importance of taking the full equilibrium effects 
into account.
In addition to bolstering the case for our empirical strategy using falsification 
exercises, overidentification tests, and a number of specification checks, we also 
demonstrate that our main estimates are quite robust. They are very similar (i) when 
we only exploit historical sources of variation from neighbors of neighbors (instead 
of relying on variation of the neighbors); (ii) if we do not control for the current road 
network (our baseline results do control for this network); (iii) when we focus on 
subsets of our instruments; (iv) when we assign different weights on the spillovers 
from different neighbors or even when we allow spillovers to go beyond adjacent 
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municipalities; (v) when we include a battery of additional controls; (vi) when we 
exclude high crime areas or capital cities; (vii) when we use more flexible functional 
forms; and (viii) when we vary the form of spillovers.
We also extend our structural model to incorporate the decisions of the national 
state concerning local state capacity. In Colombia, while municipalities hire and 
pay for a range of local state employees (a large part of it with transfers from the 
national state), the number of police and judges in the municipality are decided by 
the national state. Incorporating this additional layer of interaction in the structural 
model has little effect on our estimates of the impact of local state capacity, but 
allows us to shed light on the role of national state presence.
We are unaware of any other study that either estimates the effect of local 
(municipality -level) state capacity on local outcomes, or models and estimates 
the network externalities and strategic interactions in this context. The only partial 
exceptions we are aware of are Dell’s (2015) study of how changes in law enforce-
ment shift the activities of drug gangs across the transport network linking Mexican 
municipalities to the United States; a recent paper by Durante and Guiterrez (2013) 
on the role of inter-jurisdictional cooperation in crime-fighting across Mexican 
municipalities; Case, Rosen, and Hines’ (1993) work on the relationship between 
the public expenditures of neighboring US states; and Di Tella and Schargrodsky’s 
(2004) work showing (negative) spillovers in policing from one part of Buenos 
Aires to neighboring areas.
In addition, our paper relates to several literatures. First, we build on and extend 
the literature on the effect of state capacity on economic development, which has 
already been discussed. In addition to the empirical and historical studies mentioned 
above, there has recently been a small literature on the modeling of the emergence 
of state capacity or persistence of states which lack capacity (“weak”). Acemoglu 
(2005) constructs a model in which a self-interested ruler taxes and invests in public 
goods and citizens make investment decisions. Weak states are detrimental to eco-
nomic development because they discourage the ruler from investing in public goods, 
as they limit his or her future ability to raise taxes. Besley and Persson (2009, 2011) 
also emphasize the importance of state capacity and suggest that state-building will be 
deterred when each group is afraid that the state they build will be used against them 
in the future.2 Our model takes a different direction, and in the process, highlights 
a new effect: state-building will be deterred unless a national body plays a defining 
role in this process, because local authorities will underinvest in state capacity as they 
ignore the spillovers they create on their neighbors. Since our estimates suggest that 
these spillovers are sizable, this effect could be quite important in practice.
In utilizing a network game to model state-building investments and for our empir-
ical work, our paper also relates to the literature on network games. Theoretically, our 
model is a variant of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009); Bramoulle, 
Kranton, and D’Amours (2014); and Allouch (2015). Other papers dealing with 
related issues include Topa (2001); Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001); Sacerdote 
2 Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2011) and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013) provide various models 
of persistence of weak states with low state capacity, while another branch of literature, including Thies (2005); 
Gennaioli and Voth (forthcoming); and Cárdenas, Eslava, and Ramírez (2011) for Colombia, investigates the his-
torical determinants of state capacity. 
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(2001); Nakajima (2007); Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008); and Bramoulle, Djebbari, 
and Fortin (2009); though, to the best of our knowledge, no other study uses a sim-
ilar empirical strategy or combines structural modeling and historical instrumental 
variables to estimate the parameters of this type of model.
There is a small literature on within-country variation in state capacity as well. 
O’Donnell (1993) emphasized that the uneven distribution of state capacity in Latin 
America led to variation in the quality of democracy at the subnational level. Related 
ideas have emerged in the literature on civil wars, with scholars suggesting that con-
flict starts and persists in parts of countries with low state capacity (e.g., Goodwin 
2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; and Kalyvas 2006; as well as Sánchez 2007, for 
the Colombian case).3 Research on within-country income differences has pointed 
to institutional differences as a potential cause of this variation (e.g., Acemoglu 
and Dell 2010; Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2012; Bruhn and Gallego 
2012), but has not focused on variation in state capacity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a discussion of 
the Colombian context, particularly focusing on the weakness of the local and the 
national state. Section II presents a simple model of investments in state capacity 
within a network. Section III presents our data. Section IV discusses our empirical 
strategy and presents our main estimates and some robustness checks focusing on 
the simplified model without the national state. Section V describes our empirical 
strategy and results for the general model. Section VI shows how our estimates can 
be used for determining the gains from optimally reallocating state capacity invest-
ments across municipalities. Section VII concludes. Appendix A presents proofs and 
derivations, while online Appendix B contains additional results.
I. Context
State capacity in Colombian history has been notable in its relative absence on 
average and its great variability. In 1870, with a total population of around 2.7 mil-
lion, the total number of both state and national level public employees in Colombia 
was 4,500, or just 0.0015 bureaucrats per inhabitant (Palacios and Safford 2002). 
In contrast, public employees per capita in the United States in 1870 were 0.011, an 
order of magnitude greater (1870 US census).
The Colombian state also lacked another key aspect of state capacity, the capa-
bility to raise fiscal revenues, which remained absent well into the twentieth century 
(Deas 1982; and Rincón and Junguito 2007). As late as 1970, tax revenue was only 
around 5 percent of GDP (Rincón and Junguito 2007). Some isolated regions, such 
as the Chocó or the eastern plains, have yet to be fully integrated with the rest of 
the country economically or politically.4 Commenting on this issue in 1912, Rufino 
Gutierrez argued
3 In the literature on state formation in the nineteenth century United States, there is a heavy emphasis on the 
critical role of federal and local government (e.g., Novak 2008), and similar concerns have emerged in the literature 
on Latin America (see, e.g., Soifer 2012). 
4 One of the main purposes of the 1991 Constitution was to increase the extent of decentralization in Colombia 
and in the process to contribute to local state-building. It mandated transfers from the central government to the local 
level, which would be used for public good provision at the municipality level. Despite these major institutional 
changes in the late twentieth century, large swathes of Colombia still have very weak state presence. Moreover, 
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… in most municipalities there was no city council, mayor, district judge, 
tax collector … even less for road-building boards, nor whom to count on 
for the collection and distribution of rents, nor who may dare collect the 
property tax or any other contribution to the politically connected … 
 — (Gutierrez 1920, our translation)
There are several historical root causes of state weakness in Colombia. During 
the colonial period, Spain restricted migration to its American colonies so that the 
settler population was very small and did not constitute a powerful voice push-
ing for a more effective colonial state. The colonial state used direct methods to 
extract rents from indigenous people, such as tribute and forced labor, rather than 
developing a tax system that would later become the foundation of state capacity. 
The topography of the country also constrains the reach of the state. The Andean 
Cordillera splits the country into a patchwork of relatively disconnected regions. 
Furthermore, Colombians resisted the Bourbon attempts at state centralization in the 
late eighteenth century so that, uniquely in the Americas, the Spanish were not able 
to set up their new system (see Paquette 2012; Phelan 1978; and McFarlane 1993, 
for Colombia). Though as a consequence of these reforms, the province of Nueva 
Granada became a viceroyalty in 1717 and then again in 1739, the colonial state 
remained absent throughout most of the territory, except in and around a few cities 
and towns. For example, in 1794, the capital Bogotá and the major slave and gold 
trading port Cartagena housed 70 percent of all crown employees in the viceroyalty.
After independence, the colonial fiscal system was continued until the Liberals’ 
rise to power in 1850 (Jaramillo, Meisel, and Urrutia 2006). The Liberal regime cut 
tariffs and abolished monopolies, causing a fiscal crisis and a significant downsizing 
of the already emaciated state (Deas 1982). In the mid-nineteenth century, Colombia 
adopted a federal system, further weakening the attempts of national state-building. 
During this federal period, each state had its own army, so that even the monopoly 
of violence of the national state was not attempted until the end of the War of a 
Thousand Days in 1903. Palacios and Safford (2002, p. 27) describe state weakness 
in Colombia during this epoch as follows:
In the decade of the 1870s, an attempt to use national funds to build a rail-
road that would benefit the east triggered intense antagonism in the west 
and the [Caribbean] coast … as a result, small, poorly financed and often 
failed projects proliferated…
As a consequence of this pervasive state weakness, there was little local public 
good provision in most of Colombia before the 1930s. Systematic local public good 
provision became possible only after the decentralization initiated in the mid-1980s, 
and deepened with the 1991 Constitution. The geographically-varied lack of state 
capacity, combined with recent decentralization of some public services to munici-
palities, makes the study of the implications of local state capacity on public goods 
provision and prosperity in Colombia particularly relevant.
during the 1990s and early 2000s the national state lost control of large areas of the country to private armies of 
guerrillas and paramilitaries. 
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II. A Simple Model of State-Building in a Network
Building on the literature on network games (e.g., Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and 
Zenou 2006; Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; Bramoulle, Kranton, 
and D’Amours 2014; and Allouch 2015) we now develop a simple game-theoretic 
model of the determination of local and national state. The economy consists of a 
network of municipalities and a national state. Each municipality is a node in this 
network, municipalities sharing a border are connected, and all links are undirected. 
Several dimensions of public goods and prosperity in each municipality depend 
on local state capacity, the national state’s capacity there, and the spillover effects 
of state capacity from neighboring municipalities. The national state has heteroge-
neous preferences over prosperity across municipalities. All municipalities and the 
national state simultaneously choose their levels of state capacity to maximize their 
payoff, which is a function of the relative costs and benefits of state capacity. This 
model determines the equilibrium distribution of local and national state capacity 
across municipalities, and hence the equilibrium distribution of prosperity.
A. Network Structure and Preferences
Let  i denote a municipality, and  F be an  n × n matrix with entries  f ij given by
  f ij =  1 _____________ 1 +  δ 1 d ij (1 +  δ 2 e ij ) ,
where  d ij denotes the distance along the geodesic connecting the centroids of munic-
ipalities  i and  j , and  e ij is a measure of variability of altitude along the geodesic 
connecting the centroids of municipalities  i and  j . The parameters  f ij s allow for 
differential decay of spillovers between municipalities depending on topographic 
features of the landscape, an important feature in the Colombian context since topo-
graphic conditions are highly variable and rapidly changing.
Let  N(i) denote the set of municipalities connected to  i , which will be the set of 
municipalities that create spillovers on  i . In our baseline, these will be the munici-
palities that are adjacent to  i , though we also experiment with alternative definitions 
of the set  N(i) as described below.
The matrix  N(δ) denotes the symmetric matrix with entries  n  ij representing both 
the presence of a link between two municipalities and the strength of any spillovers 
that may take place along that link:
  n ij =  { 0  if j ∉ N(i)   f ij   if j ∈ N(i) .
We allow several dimensions of prosperity in a municipality to depend upon own 
state capacity and neighboring state capacity in the following way:
(1)  p i j =  κ i   s i + ϕ s i   N i  (δ)s +  γ j   N i  (δ)s +  u i j ,
where  p i j is the  j th dimension/index of prosperity in municipality  i ,  s i ∈ [0, ∞) is 
municipality  i ’s state capacity, and  N i (δ) is the  i th row of the network matrix, with  s 
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denoting the full column vector of state capacity levels. In addition,  κ i is the effect of 
municipality  i ’s state capacity on its own prosperity, which we model as a function 
of historical and other characteristics of a municipality:
(2)  κ i = g( c i  φ +  x i  β) +  ς   i D +  ξ ̃i .
Here  c i and  x i are vectors of historical and contemporary municipality character-
istics,  g( · ) is an arbitrary smooth function, the  ς   i D s denote a full set of department 
fixed effects, and  ξ ̃i represents unobserved (to the econometrician) heterogeneity. 
We assume it is observed by all the players in the game, so that we have a game of 
complete information.5 The parameter ϕ captures any interaction (or cross) effects 
between own prosperity and neighbors’ state capacity, while  γ   j is the direct effect of 
neighboring state capacity on prosperity outcome  j . Finally, the  u 
i
 j s denote the error 
term in equation (1), and are modeled as a function of observable covariates as well:
(3)  u i j =  x i   β ̃ u j +  ς ̃i Dj +  ϵ   i j ,
where  ϵ   i j is a mean zero random component. Relative to (2), this equation excludes 
the variables in the vector  c i , which will be the exclusion restrictions discussed 
in detail below (and in addition also imposes linearity, which is for simplicity). 
Throughout the theoretical and empirical analysis below, we allow for arbitrary spa-
tial correlation of the random components,  ξ ̃i and  ϵ   i j, which is important given the 
potentially spatially correlated nature of the omitted factors that might affect state 
capacity or outcomes at the municipality level.
Notice that though  γ   j is allowed to vary across the different dimensions of pros-
perity, the cross effects and own effects are imposed to be the same for all these 
dimensions (i.e.,  ϕ and  κ i do not vary by  j ). This is because, as we will see below, 
these parameters will be identified from the best response equations, which do not 
depend on the dimension of prosperity we are considering. These restrictions are 
plausible in view of the fact that the  p 
i
 j s are standardized  z -scores.
B. The General Case
Our general model allows state capacity in municipality  i to be a constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) composite of both locally chosen  l i ∈ [0, ∞) , and 
 nationally chosen state capacity,  b i ∈ [0, ∞) :
(4)  s i =  [α l i  σ−1 ____σ  + (1 − α) b i  σ−1 ____σ  ] 
 σ ____ σ−1
  σ > 0 .
5 Observed and unobserved heterogeneous effects of state capacity on own prosperity are quite plausible in this 
context, since various geographic, historical, political, and social factors will create variation in the effectiveness 
of state capacity, for example, because there is greater need for the local state to provide health care or public ser-
vices in some municipalities, or because patronage appointments driven by the highly clientelistic nature of local 
Colombian politics (e.g., Dávila Ladrón de Guevera and Leal Buitrago 2010) reduce the impact of measured state 
presence on prosperity in some municipalities. The random component of these heterogeneous effects,  ξ ̃i , which is 
allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with elements in  g( · ) , is also plausible for another reason: as we will see below, 
without this random component, best response equations would be deterministic, which would not be a reasonable 
empirical specification. 
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We use a reduced-form representation of decisions within municipalities focus-
ing on costs and benefits of state capacity (and thus essentially ignore political econ-
omy factors). Each municipality  i decides its own state capacity  l i , taking as given 
the choices of its neighbors and the national state to maximize
(5)  U i =  1 __J  ∑ j 
 
   p 
i
 j −  θ __
2
 l i 2 ,
where  J is the total number of prosperity outcomes. Preferences of the national state 
are




   { U iζ i −  η __2  b i 2 } ,  
where the  ζ i s are the heterogeneous weights that the national state puts on each 
municipality, determined by political economy factors, for example, depending on 
the distribution of swing voters (e.g., Stromberg 2008), or on who is in control of 
local politics (e.g., Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013).6 Throughout, we focus 
on Nash equilibria of this simultaneous-moves game.
The first-order conditions for the municipalities and the national state determine 
the equilibria of this game. The conditions with respect to  l i give the best response 
of the state capacity choice of municipality  i as
(7)  α [  s i  __ l i] 
 1 __σ [ κ i + ϕ N i  (δ)s] − θ l i{ ≤ 0 if  l i = 0  = 0 if  l i > 0 ,
which is written in complementary slackness form. The sign of  ϕ determines whether 
this is a game of strategic substitutes ( ϕ < 0 ) or strategic complements ( ϕ > 0 ).
For the national state, the first-order conditions with respect to each  b i yield
(8)  (1 − α) [  s i  __ b i] 
 1 __σ { ζ i [ κ i + ϕ N i (δ)s] + ϕ N i (δ)(s ∗ ζ) +  1 __J  ∑ j 
 
 γ     j  N i (δ)ζ}  
    − η  b i{ ≤ 0 if  b i = 0  = 0 if  b i > 0 ,
where  ∗ designates element-by-element multiplication. Notice from equation (8) 
that for any set of nonnegative weights  ζ such that  ζ k > 0 for at least one  k ∈ N(i) 
for each  i , the conditions  ϕ > 0 and  γ   j > 0 for all  j are sufficient for  b i > 0 in 
any equilibrium. In other words, if spillovers are positive and the game is one of 
strategic complements, the only way the national level could allocate no state pres-
ence in municipality  i is if both this municipality’s weight and the weights of all of 
its neighbors are zero. As we will describe below, in our data both local and national 
6 However, equation (5) rules out situations in which the national state just cares about extracting resources 
from some municipalities, or those in which there is an explicit competition between local and national states or 
politicians. 
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state capacity choices are strictly positive for all municipalities. This will allow us 
to focus on interior equilibria.7
The next proposition draws on Allouch (2015), who establishes that for network 
games with nonlinear best responses, a bound on the slope of the best responses is 
a sufficient condition for uniqueness. This bound is a function of the lowest eigen-
value of the network matrix  N(δ) , which quantifies the extent to which the spillovers 
across agents are spread through the network structure. Adapting this result to our 
setting and denoting the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix  N(δ) , which is always 
negative, by  λ min , we have the following:
PROPOSITION 1 (Allouch 2015): If for every player  1 +  1 ________  λ min (N(δ)) < 
 ( ∂   l i _____ ∂   N i (δ)s) 
−1
 < 1 , then the game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
For the estimated parameter vector  (α, σ, θ, φ, γ, δ) , the conditions in 
Proposition 1 are readily verifiable. Equations (1), (7), and (8) determine the joint 
equilibrium distribution of local and national state capacity and prosperity.
C. The Linear Case ( α = 1 )
Our model simplifies considerably in the case where  α = 1 , which makes 
national choices irrelevant and implies  s i =  l i in equation (7). In this case, the best 
response equation (7) becomes linear in neighbors’ state capacity:
(9)  s i =  ϕ __θ  N i  (δ)s +  
 κ i  __θ .
In terms of this equation,  
ϕ __θ is what is referred to as an “endogenous effect” in the 
peer effects literature: it corresponds to the effect of neighbors’ or peers’ choices 
on own choice, while the  γ   j s in equation (10) are referred to as “contextual effects” 
(see, e.g., Manski 1993). Even though the key equation of our model, (1), features 
only contextual effects and no endogenous effects, strategic choices make best 
responses take the form of an endogenous effect.
Substituting for  s i from (9) into (1), we obtain the observed relationship between 
prosperity and own and neighbors’ state capacity as
(10)  p 
i
 j = θ s i 2 +  γ   j   N i  (δ)s +  u   i j .
Equation (10) highlights that the identification of the impact of own state capacity 
on prosperity,  κ i , and of the interaction effect,  ϕ , requires some care: because of the 
best response of municipality  i , the parameters  κ i and  ϕ drop out of the relationship 
between prosperity and state capacity, and cannot be identified from a regression 
of  p 
i
 j s on state capacity. Instead, such a regression can only identify (in addition to 
7 Existence of pure-strategy equilibria can be guaranteed straightforwardly either if  ϕ > 0 , so that this is a 
game of strategic complements, or if  α <  l i  
σ+1 ____σ  s i  σ−1 ____σ  for all  l i and  s i that are a solution to (7), ensuring quasi-con-
cavity and thus enabling us to apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Proposition 1 provides sufficient conditions for 
existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy equilibria. 
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the spillover parameters  γ   j ) the cost parameter  θ . Our empirical approach, detailed 
below, will overcome this difficulty as well.8
With  α = 1 , the existence of pure strategy equilibria follows immediately from 
concavity and Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, and uniqueness of an interior (pos-
itive) equilibrium, where all municipalities choose a positive investment in state 
capacity, is also guaranteed, since such an equilibrium is given by the solution to 
a set of linear equations. However, multiple equilibria with some municipalities 
choosing zero investment may exist unless the sufficient condition for uniqueness in 
Proposition 1 is satisfied.9
Equations (9) and (10) determine the joint distribution of local state capacity and 
prosperity across municipalities, and will be the focus of the first part of the paper. 
The just-explained identification challenge notwithstanding, the parameters ( θ ,  ϕ , 
γ ,  δ ) can be identified if these two equations are estimated simultaneously (and 
of course with the appropriate sources of variation, which we discuss in detail in 
Section IV): the parameter  θ is identified from (10), and given this parameter,  ϕ can 
be recovered from the endogenous effect estimated in equation (9), and the local 
average of the  κ i s from the intercept in equation (9).
III. Data
For our empirical implementation, the data we use, summarized as 
 { ( p i ,  l i,  b i,  x i ,  c i ) i=1 n , D, E, A} , include cross-sectional information on several 
dimensions of prosperity  p i , local ( l i ) and national ( b i ) choices of state capacity, 
municipality characteristics  x i , and colonial state presence characteristics  c i . In 
addition,  D ,  E , and  A are  n × n matrices containing the geodesic distances between 
the centroids of all pairs of municipalities, an index of variability in altitude along 
these geodesics, and the adjacency status of each pair of municipalities, respectively. 
We describe the nature and sources of these data below.
The Fundacion Social (FS), a Colombian NGO, collected and put together 
detailed data on state presence at the municipality level in 1995. Out of a total of 
1,103 municipalities in Colombia, FS collected data for 1,019 of them. The two 
municipalities in the Department of San Andrés, an archipelago in the Caribbean 
comprised of several smaller islands and located 775 km from the mainland, are 
excluded from the sample. The remaining 1,017 municipalities comprise our main 
sample and the number of nodes in our network (though depending on data avail-
ability some specifications have fewer observations).
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. For each municipality, FS records 
the number of municipality (local) public employees, the number of national state 
8 Note also that in equation (10) the spillovers and feedbacks between municipality choices within the network 
game lead to a quadratic reduced-form relationship between own state capacity and prosperity, so linear regressions 
may lead to misspecification, though we will see below that marginal effects from the estimation of “naïve” linear 
regressions, when properly instrumented, are similar to our structural estimates. 
9 A closely related sufficient condition for equilibrium follows from the work of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, 
and Zenou (2009) and Bramoulle, Kranton, and D’Amours (2014), and takes the form  | λ min (N(δ))| <  (  |ϕ|  ___θ ) 
−1
 . 
Yet another way to ensure uniqueness is by noting that when  ϕ > 0 (so that we have a game of strategic comple-
ments),  κ i ≥ 0 for all  i is sufficient to rule out  l i = 0 , and then uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of an 
interior equilibrium noted above. 
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public employees, the number of police stations, courts, notary offices, Telecom 
offices, post offices, agricultural bank branches, public hospitals, public health cen-
ters, public health posts, public schools, public libraries, fire stations, jails, deed 
registry offices, and tax collection offices.
Because our theoretical framework stresses and exploits the difference between 
local and national state capacities, we rely on the Colombian legislation (in particu-
lar, Law 60 of 1993 and Articles 287, 288, and 311–321 of the 1991 Constitution) to 
establish the presence and the number of employees of agencies which are decided 
at the local level, and those which are decided at the national level. Police, courts, 
and public hospitals fall under the responsibility of the national state. The location 
of agricultural bank branches was also partly determined centrally. All other agen-
cies are under the jurisdiction of the municipality. Because, as noted in the intro-
duction, our focus is on the “infrastructural” features of state capacity, we construct 
two measures of local state capacity  l i : (i) the number of municipality-level bureau-
crats, which excludes police officers, judges, all other judicial employees, and pub-
lic hospital employees, and (ii) the total count of municipality state agencies (notary 
offices, Telecom offices, post offices, health centers, health posts, schools, libraries, 
fire stations, jails, deed registry offices, and tax collection offices). We treat these 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Median SD
State capacity Local-level state agencies 21.6 10.0 105.1
Local-level municipality employees 99.6 20.0 843.4
National-level municipality employees 1,038.9 220.0 7,900.2
Prosperity Life quality index 49.8 48.0 9.9
Public utilities coverage rate 53.7 53.4 21.5
Fraction of population above poverty line 56.4 57.2 14.3
Secondary enrollment rate 56.9 56.4 23.5
Primary enrollment rate 96.8 100.0 9.5
Vaccination coverage rate 45.2 43.8 16.8
Historical variables Colonial state officials 5.7 0.0 122.9
Colonial state agencies 0.6 0.0 0.9
Distance to royal roads (km) 26.1 13.8 34.6
Population in 1843 (000) 2.9 2.9 2.1
Network variables Number of neighbors (degree) 5.5 5.0 1.8
Geodesic distance to neighbors (km) 27.8 22.7 17.7
Geodesic variability in elevation to neighbors 0.8 0.7 0.5
Betweenness centrality 0.011 0.003 0.021
Bonacich centrality 86.4 74.3 67.2
Local clustering coefficient 0.45 0.40 0.18
Covariates Distance to current highway (km) 3.1 1.5 6.5
Longitude −74.8 −74.8 1.5
Latitude 5.6 5.5 2.4
Surface area (sq km) 669.3 273.5 1,425.1
Elevation (mts) 1,206.7 1,265.0 897.7
Average annual rainfall (mm) 1,894.6 1,630.5 1,067.1
Population (000) 37.4 13.8 200.5
  Number of municipalities     1,019
Note: Please see the text for variable definitions and sources.
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two variables as alternative measures of local state capacity, and proxy national state 
capacity,  b i , with the number of national public employees in the municipality.
Municipalities have three main revenue sources to finance public spending and 
investment in state infrastructure and bureaucracy: local taxes (mainly industry and 
commerce tax, and property tax), royalties from mining activities, and transfers 
from the national state. The bulk of national state transfers (“situado fiscal”) are 
allocated to each municipality using a fixed rule (geographically, this allocation 
is at the departmental level). These resources directly enter into the municipality’s 
budget. Though the law stipulates that at least  60 percent of these transfers must go 
to education and at least  20 percent to health (Law 60 of 1993), it also grants full 
discretion to the municipality on their specific allocation and use. In particular, may-
ors (who are elected officials since 1988) propose a budget which is implemented if 
approved by the elected municipality council.
To measure local prosperity (and public goods), we collected available data from 
various sources. The Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico (CEDE) at 
Universidad de los Andes provided us with average 1992–2002 primary and second-
ary school enrollment rates. From the OCHA group at the United Nations, we col-
lected data on aqueduct, sewage, and electricity household coverage rates in 2002, 
and on vaccination rates in 2002. Finally, from the Colombian national statistics 
bureau (DANE) we have data on the fraction of the population in poverty (under 
the poverty line) in 1993 and 2005, and on a life quality index for 1998. Based on 
these data, we focus on four prosperity outcomes which are likely to depend on 
local state capacity: (i) the life quality index  p i 1 ; (ii) the average public utilities 
coverage in 2002 (aggregating aqueduct, sewage, and electricity)  p i 2 ; (iii) the pop-
ulation above the poverty line in 2005  p i 3 ; and (iv) the secondary school enrollment 
rate  p i 4 . All of our prosperity measures are standardized  z -scores (observation minus 
mean divided by standard deviation). We focus on these four prosperity outcomes 
because, although they are positively correlated, as Figure  1 shows the shape of each 
distribution is significantly different, suggesting that each of these dimensions of 
prosperity contains some independent information.
We will use two other measures of local public goods, primary school enroll-
ment and vaccination coverage, and two historical outcomes, historical literacy and 
school enrollment rates from the 1918 national census, as falsification exercises. 
The reasoning for these falsification exercises is explained below.
We built the adjacency matrix of municipalities  A based on the Colombian 
National Geographic Institute (IGAC). Using Arc-GIS geo-referenced data, we 
computed the geodesic (“as the bird flies”) distance between the centroid of each 
pair of municipalities  d ij , and organized this data in matrix  D . Also using Arc-GIS 
and geo-referenced topographic data for Colombia, we computed  e ij , the index of 
the variability of altitude along the geodesic connecting the centroid of every pair 
of municipalities, capturing the frictions that a more uneven path connecting two 
municipalities imposes over the opportunities for contact and spillovers between 
them.10 We organize these data into the matrix  E .
10 More specifically, we divided each geodesic into a number of intervals for a given altitude range along the 
geodesic itself and computed the average altitude of each of the intervals. The  e ij is then computed as the variance 
of the average altitude across intervals, where each interval is appropriately weighted by its length. 
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The several dimensions of Spanish colonial state presence we utilize come from 
historical data originally collected by Durán y Díaz (1794),11 which specify the 
location of officials and state administrations. Of particular interest, Durán y Díaz 
(1794) has a complete record of every colonial official and of several state agencies 
throughout the viceroyalty. From this document we compiled municipality-level 
data on the number of crown employees, and indicators on the presence of an alca-
bala,12 a tobacco or playing cards estanco,13 a liquor or gunpowder estanco, and a 
post office. In addition to these variables, we collected information from historical 
maps in Useche Losada (1995) which depict the location of colonial royal roads. 
We geo-referenced these maps using Arc-GIS, and computed the distance between 
the centroid of each municipality and the closest royal road. Based on these data, 
11 This source is located at the National Library in Bogotá and contains a full account of state officials, salaries, 
the military, tariffs, taxes, and fiscal revenue for all of the Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada in the late eighteenth 
century. We thank Malcolm Deas for pointing us to this document. 
12 The alcabala was a sales tax (usually at 2 percent). The indicator denotes the presence of the local agency in 
charge of collecting the tax. 
13 An estanco was a state monopoly over the sale of a particular good, which also often allocated production 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Prosperity Outcomes
Notes: The figure plots the empirical distributions for the four prosperity outcomes in the sample of Colombian 
municipalities. Panel A presents the distribution of the life quality index in 1998. Panel B presents the distribution 
of the public utilities coverage (average of  aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) in 2002. Panel C presents the distri-
bution of the fraction of the population above the poverty line in 2005. Panel D presents the distribution of the aver-
age 1992–2002 secondary enrollment rate. 
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we then constructed three measures of colonial state presence: (i) the number of 
crown employees, denoted by  c i 1 ; (ii) a count of the number of agencies (between 0 
and 4) reported by Durán y Díaz, denoted by  c i 2 ; and (iii) the distance to the closest 
royal road, denoted by  c i 3 . We also collected population data from the 1843 national 
census, which we use as an instrument for current population in specifications where 
we allow for current population to be endogenous.
Finally, our main covariates included in all specifications (in the vector  x i ) are 
distance to a current highway, longitude, latitude, surface area, altitude, and average 
annual rainfall (all obtained from CEDE) as well as (log) population in 1995 (obtained 
from the Colombian National Statistical Institute, the DANE). In some specifications, 
we also use the following additional covariates: the density of primary, secondary, 
and tertiary rivers (from CEDE), and the distribution of land in each municipality by 
quality, coded as the share of each of eight qualities, and by land type, classified as 
under water, valley, mountain, hill, and plain (obtained from IGAC).
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results: The Linear Case
Our structural model fully determines the cross-sectional distribution of equi-
librium state capacity choices and prosperity outcomes.14 Our empirical strategy 
has multiple components. In this section, we first discuss the exclusion restrictions 
implied by our use of several historical variables as instruments in the context of the 
linear case where  α = 1 . The same arguments also apply to the general model stud-
ied in the next section. We then turn to various estimation strategies and empirical 
findings. As a preview, we find municipalities’ state capacity investment decisions 
are strategic complements, and that the complementarity is weak enough that our 
parameter estimates are always consistent with the network game having a unique 
equilibrium. Our results indicate that all of our prosperity outcomes are strongly 
dependent on the overall levels of state capacity in a municipality, and that state 
capacity spillovers are significant.
A. Exclusion Restrictions
In addition to the identification problem encapsulated in equation (10) discussed 
above, we face the standard challenges resulting from endogeneity and omitted vari-
able biases (in view of the fact that state capacity is endogenously determined) and 
the problems associated with the estimation of contextual and endogenous effects 
(e.g., Manski 1993). To discuss these problems and our strategy for dealing with 
them, let us substitute for (2) and (3) into (9) and (10) to obtain the equations we will 
estimate in our empirical work (for the  α = 1 case). The best response equation is
(11)  s i =  ϕ __θ  N i  (δ)s +  
1 __θ g( c i  φ +  x i  β) +  ς   i 
D +  ξ i ,
14 One could suppose that our cross-sectional data reflect the resting point of a dynamical process, for example, 
reflecting some sort of adaptive dynamics. If these dynamics are driven by the best responses of the model outlined 
above, then the conditions for uniqueness in Proposition 1 or in footnote 9 also ensure convergence (and global 
stability) of the dynamical process to the Nash equilibrium characterized above. 
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where  ξ i ≡  ξ ̃i /θ , and recall that the  ς   i D s are department fixed effects. The prosperity 
equation is (one for each dimension of prosperity indexed by  j ):
(12)  p 
i
 j = θ s i 2 +  γ     j   N i  (δ)s +  x i   β ̃    j +  ς   ̃   is jD +  ϵ   i j .
The standard endogeneity problem (for the case of  α = 1 ) is a simple conse-
quence of the fact that the error term in (12) may be correlated with  s i , i.e.,  cov ( s i ,  ϵ   i j) 
≠ 0 . There are also good reasons to suspect that spillover effects—the contextual 
effects in (12)—cannot in general be estimated consistently with OLS because of 
correlation of the error term in this equation with neighbors’ state capacity, i.e., 
 cov ( N i (δ)s,  ϵ   i j) ≠ 0 . The main reason for such a correlation is that the omitted influ-
ences on prosperity are likely to be spatially correlated; in other words, assuming 
spatial independence of the error terms in this setting would be highly implausible.
As already noted, the estimation of the own and cross effects of state capacity 
further necessitates the joint estimation of the best response equation (11), and the 
same spatial correlation concerns applied to this equation, i.e.,  cov ( N i (δ)s,  ξ i ) ≠ 0 , 
imply that the endogenous effects in this equation cannot be estimated consistently 
with OLS either.
Our strategy for dealing with both sets of concerns is to rely on historical sources 
of variation in state capacity represented by the vector  c . We argue that colonial 
state presence likely altered the relative costs and benefits of subsequent investments 
in local state presence and thus  κ i (from equation (2)). In addition, these colonial 
variables are also arguably unrelated to current prosperity outcomes except through 
their impact on state capacity, i.e.,  cov (c,  ϵ   i j) = 0 .
The main reason why we believe this exclusion restriction is plausible is that 
the location of the colonial state was determined by a variety of idiosyncratic fac-
tors that are broadly unrelated to current determinants of prosperity and have now 
ceased to have any direct relevance to economic prosperity (or public goods provi-
sion). This is most clear for the royal roads network, which was the main investment 
in communications infrastructure during the colonial period (see Useche Losada 
1995). This road network, partially inherited from precolonial roads and partially 
built under Spanish authority for a variety of different reasons including pilgrimage, 
involved steep flights of steps unsuited to horse or cart traffic (see Langebaek et al. 
2000). The considerable challenges of converting colonial royal roads into modern 
motorways meant that much of this network was not converted to railroads or high-
ways and was subsequently abandoned (see Pachón and Ramírez 2006). As a result, 
though the location of these roads reflects accurately the presence of the colonial 
state and thus the regions where the Spanish authorities were more interested in 
controlling the territory, distance to these roads should have no direct effect on pres-
ent-day public goods or prosperity (especially since we also control for the current 
road network). Although it is possible that the location of these roads may have 
influenced prosperity during early colonial times and this prosperity has persisted, 
we will provide evidence against this channel explaining our results as well.
Figure 2 shows that our measures of colonial state presence, the size of the crown 
bureaucracy, and the number of state agencies, concentrate around specific areas, 
beyond which the colonial state was mostly absent. This reflects the colonial settle-
ment strategy, which aimed at achieving several different objectives. For example, 
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in regions heavily involved in gold mining during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the presence of colonial officials and crown agencies was narrowly related 
to taxation functions and followed the gold reserves. In regions with higher densities 
of Spanish settlers and their descendants, on the other hand, the demand for public 
services such as legal adjudication and market regulation translated into a different 
type of colonial state. Finally, in strategically located places, such as the Caribbean 
coast or key outposts along the Magdalena River (the main communications chan-
nel at the time), the presence of the Spanish colonial state was related to military 
objectives, for instance the provision of services to the Spanish fleet. Just like the 
royal roads network, none of these factors are relevant any longer, and therefore, 
though they influence the costs and benefits of building and maintaining local state 
capacity, they should have no direct effect on present-day prosperity except through 
state capacity.
Critically for our empirical strategy, the exclusion restriction  cov (c,  ϵ   i j) = 0 
also implies that these colonial variables should also be uncorrelated with the error 
terms in the prosperity equations of neighbors, i.e.,  cov ( N i (δ)c,  ϵ   i j) = 0 and in 
fact,  cov ( N i k (δ)c,  ϵ   i j) = 0 , where  N i k (δ) denotes the  i th row of the  k th integer power 
of the matrix  N(δ) (e.g.,  N 2 (δ) is the matrix of neighbors of neighbors). Intuitively, 
if colonial state presence and distance to royal roads of a municipality has no direct 
Panel A. Number of crown employees Panel B. Number of state agencies 












Figure 2. Colonial State Presence, 1794
Notes: Panel A presents the current municipality-level spatial distribution of crown employees in 1794. Panel B 
presents the current municipality-level spatial distribution of the count of colonial state agencies in 1794, including 
alcabalas, tobacco and  playing cards estancos, liquor and gunpowder estancos, and post offices.  
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effect on public goods and prosperity in that municipality, it should also have no 
impact on the same outcomes in neighboring municipalities.15 The same reasoning 
can further be applied to the best response equation, (11), so that we should also 
have  cov( N i k (δ)c,  ξ i ) = 0 for any integer  k .
One concern with the strategy utilized here is that even if the argument for the 
validity of the colonial variables as instruments for own state capacity is plausible, 
they may happen to be spatially correlated (a particularly likely outcome for his-
torical and geographic variables), making the lack of correlation with neighbors’ 
error terms less plausible. In the Colombian setting, however, the Spanish state’s 
heterogeneous objectives and its strategy of locating bureaucracies and agencies in 
particular cities that had control and jurisdiction over surrounding areas meant that 
towns with relatively high levels of colonial state presence typically had neighbors 
with relatively low state presence, and hence the spatial correlation of the colonial 
state is very weak or negative (see Figure 2).
Table 2 confirms this by presenting the within-department spatial correlation 
matrix of our three colonial state presence variables. Own colonial state employees 
are weakly negatively correlated with neighbors’ and neighbors of neighbors’ colo-
nial state employees (−0.061 and −0.062 respectively). Similarly, own colonial 
state agencies are basically uncorrelated with neighbors’ and neighbors of neigh-
bors’ colonial state agencies (0.022 and 0.078 respectively). Perhaps somewhat 
more surprisingly, the same is also true of the distance to royal roads variable: the 
correlation between own and neighboring distance to royal roads is only 0.28, and 
the correlation falls to 0.045 between own and neighbors of neighbors’ distance 
to royal roads. In conjunction with the colonial state presence variables that are 
spatially negatively correlated, this pattern alleviates any concerns resulting from 
spatially correlated instruments leading to biased estimates.
15 Crucially for this argument, the network structure of municipalities, given by the administrative map of 
Colombia, physical distances, and variability of altitude, are taken as exogenous. This is plausible in view of the 
fact that about 85 percent of Colombian municipalities were created before 1900. 
Table 2—Within Department Correlations of Historical State Presence Variables  
Averaged across Departments























1.000                    
0.283 1.000
0.045 0.615 1.000
−0.095 −0.072 −0.047 1.000
−0.146 0.039 0.060 −0.061 1.000
−0.044 0.063 0.072 −0.062 −0.070 1.000
−0.135 −0.039 −0.017 0.545 −0.006 −0.002 1.000
−0.208 0.250 0.283 −0.053 0.490 0.008 0.022 1.000
−0.193 0.244 0.334   −0.036 0.031 0.408   0.078 0.289 1.000
Note: Correlations reported are the average across departments of the correlations for each department.
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B. Instrumental-Variables Estimates
We propose several alternative estimation strategies, all relying on the exclusion 
restrictions outlined above. The first and most straightforward approach we pursue 
is to fix  δ and let  g( · ) be approximated by a linear function, enabling the estimation 
of equations (11) and (12) separately using linear IV. Specifically, we use six instru-
ments for  N i (δ)s in our benchmark specification (11): neighbors’ crown employees, 
number of neighbors’ colonial agencies, neighbors’ distance to royal roads, and 
neighbors of neighbors’ crown employees, number of neighbors of neighbors’ colo-
nial agencies, and neighbors of neighbors’ distance to royal roads. Our model is 
overidentified, enabling us to perform overidentification tests to verify the (internal) 
validity of our instruments (below we also report estimates using only subsets of the 
instruments).
Table 3 presents the estimates for equation (11), where we impose  δ = (1, 1) 
and assume  g( · ) to be a linear function:  g( c i  φ +  x i  β)/θ = a +  c i  φ +  x i  β . In 
our benchmark estimates, our vector of covariates  x i includes longitude, latitude, 
surface area, elevation, rainfall, a dummy for department capital, distance to a cur-
rent highway, and current (1995) population. We measure state capacity alternately 
as the number of public agencies (columns 1–3) or the number of municipality 
employees (columns 5–7). For ease of comparison, all reported values are average 
marginal effects. Throughout, all standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation 
using the Conley (1999) adjustment, adapted to our network structure,16 and for the 
reported marginal effects, they are computed using the delta method.
Columns 1 and 5 present OLS estimates as a benchmark. Columns 2 and 6 report 
the instrumental variables estimates for the same equation (with log population 
treated as an exogenous covariate). Finally, columns 3 and 7 treat population as 
endogenous, instrumenting it using the 1843 population (we also include a dummy 
for municipalities without population data in the 1843 census). The bottom panel 
of the table includes the first-stage estimates for  N i (δ)s , showing a strong positive 
correlation of neighbors’ state capacity with neighbors’ historical variables (positive 
for colonial state presence and negative for distance to royal roads), and unsur-
prisingly, a somewhat weaker relationship with neighbors of neighbors’ historical 
variables. At the bottom, we also report overidentification tests for the validity of the 
instruments, which never reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
All of our estimates in Table 3 show a positive and precisely estimated slope 
for the best response equation, which yields a positive interaction effect  ϕ and 
implies that the game between municipalities exhibits strategic complementarities. 
Interestingly, the IV estimates are always close to the OLS ones. Though neighbors’ 
colonial state officials, colonial state agencies, and distance to royal roads all are 
16 The robust spatial correlation-corrected variance matrix of the IV estimator takes the form
 (X′ Z(Z′ Z ) −1 Z′ X ) −1 X′ Z(Z′ Z ) −1 Z′  W ˆ Z(Z′ Z ) −1 Z′ X(X′ Z(Z′ Z ) −1 Z′ X ) −1 , where 
 W ˆ = Ω ∗ I +  ∑ 
j=1
t
  t + 1 − j_____ 
t + 1  (Ω ∗  N t (δ) +  [Ω ∗  N t (δ)]  ′ ) , 
 t is the highest network degree at which we truncate spatial correlation (we truncate the spatial correlation at 
second-degree adjacency, in practice allowing for arbitrary decaying spatial correlation between neighbors and 
neighbors of neighbors),  Ω is the outer product of the residuals, and  ∗ denotes element-by-element multiplication. 
2383acemoglu et al.: state capacity and economic developmentvol. 105 no. 8
statistically  significant with the right sign in the first stage, only the colonial state 
officials variable is significant in the best response equation (but when only one 
of these variables is used, it is consistently significant with the right sign as we 
see in online Appendix Table 3). The estimate in column 3,  0.020 (s.e. =  0.003 ), 
Table 3—Contemporary State Equilibrium Best Response
State capacity 
Equilibrium best response
measured as log of: Number of state agencies Number of municipality employees
OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM
Panel I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 d s i /d s j 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.016
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
d s i /d(colonial state 0.127 0.128 0.108 −0.040 0.129 0.130 0.105 0.087
 official s i ) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.050) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.069)
d s i /d(colonial state 0.003 0.001 −0.016 0.096 0.017 0.017 −0.002 0.085
 agencie s i ) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.055) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.085)
d s i /d(distance to 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.074 −0.035 −0.035 −0.038 −0.036
 royal road s i ) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.044)
                   
Panel II First stage for  N i (δ)s
Neighbors’ colonial 0.320 0.338 0.556 0.637
 state officials (0.096) (0.100) (0.143) (0.155)
Neighbors’ colonial 1.275 1.242 1.673 1.631
 state agencies (0.126) (0.131) (0.211) (0.223)
Neighbors’ distance −1.031 −0.992 −1.497 −1.456
 to royal roads (0.219) (0.223) (0.278) (0.287)
Neighbors of neighbors’ 0.209 0.269 0.311 0.427
 colonial state officials (0.170) (0.177) (0.240) (0.258)
Neighbors of neighbors’ 0.649 0.568 1.085 0.937
 colonial state agencies (0.181) (0.190) (0.264) (0.281)
Neighbors of neighbors’ 0.178 0.172 0.268 0.296
 distance to royal roads (0.169) (0.173) (0.231) (0.236)
First-stage R2   0.681 0.671     0.681 0.658  
F-test for excluded instruments 17.0 145.6 19.55 171.0
F-test p-value   0.000 0.000     0.000 0.000  
Overidentification test: Test statistic 4.053 6.350 4.399 5.775
 χ 2            p-value 0.542 0.385     0.494 0.449  
log population Control Control Instrum Instrum Control Control Instrum Instrum
Observations 975 975 975 963   1,017 1,017 1,017 1,003
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. All models include department fixed effects and the fol-
lowing vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual rainfall, distance to current highway, 
and a department capital dummy. Columns 1–4 use the log number of local state agencies as the measure of state 
capacity, and columns 5–8 use the log number of municipality employees as the measure of state capacity. Panel I 
reports the estimates of the best response equation, and panel II reports the first stage for the instrumental variables 
models of columns 2, 3, 6, and 7. In the models reported in columns 2 and 6, log population is treated as exogenous. 
In the models reported in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, log population is instrumented using 1843 population. Models in 
column 4 are estimated with GMM as a system together with those reported in columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 of Table 4A. 
Models in column 8 are estimated with GMM as a system together with those reported in columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 
of Table 4B. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for arbi-
trary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to the network structure as described 
in the text. For models with more than one endogenous right-hand-side variable, the F-test is corrected following 
Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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implies that moving the number of state agencies of a neighbor from the median 
(10) to the mean (21) leads to a 1.5 percent increase in own state agencies at the 
median of the distribution.17 Notice that this is only the direct (“partial equilib-
rium”) response, and does not take into account the equilibrium feedbacks that take 
place through network effects as other municipalities also respond because of stra-
tegic complementarities.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 present the results of the IV estimate of the slope of 
the best response equation with the alternative measure of state capacity, municipal-
ity employees. The estimates in this case have very similar magnitudes and preci-
sion to those using the number of local state agencies, and the first stages are also 
very comparable.
For the prosperity equation (12), we have two first stages, one for  s i 2 and one for 
N i (δ)s . We use the same set of instruments as for the best response equation (11), 
but also exploit the nonlinear reduced-form relationship between prosperity and 
state capacity by including a quartic in these instruments.18 Marginal effects from 
the estimation of equation (12) are depicted in Tables 4A and 4B, which also present 
p-values for the joint significance of the set of instruments in both first stages for 
equation (12). We again present benchmark OLS and IV results from the estimation 
of each of our four prosperity outcomes equations separately. Columns 1–3 present 
17  10.15 = exp  ((0.02)ln (22/11) + ln (11)) − 1 , which is a  1.5 percent increase from the median state capac-
ity of  10 . 
18 The results are similar if we only use a quadratic in these instruments as shown in online Appendix Table 3. 
Table 4A—Prosperity and Public Goods Structural Equation
State capacity measured as: log of number of municipality state agencies
Prosperity equation
Life quality index Public utilities coverage
OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM
Panel I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 d p i /d s i 0.802 0.394 0.389 0.314 0.602 0.563 0.567 0.314
(0.044) (0.135) (0.143) (0.041) (0.037) (0.127) (0.134) (0.041)
 d p i /d s j 0.015 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.027
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Panel II First stage for  s i 
2 
F-test for excluded instruments 31.23 35.39 31.01 35.06
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.670 0.655 0.670 0.655
First-stage linear model First stage for  N i (δ)s
F-test for excluded instruments 526.7 523.7 524.6 522.1
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.769 0.770       0.769 0.770  
log population Control Control Instrum Instrum Control Control Instrum Instrum
Observations 973 973 973 963   975 975 975 963
(Continued )
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results for the life quality index, columns 5–7 for utilities coverage, columns 9–11 
for the fraction of the population above the poverty line, and columns 13–15 for the 
secondary school enrollment rate. Table 4A presents the estimates for the models 
using the number of agencies, and Table 4B shows the estimates for the models 
using the number of municipality employees. Once again, we first control for popu-
lation and subsequently instrument it with historical (1843) population. In all cases 
except for secondary schooling, we find both strong own effects that are highly sig-
nificant and precisely estimated spillover effects. The results for secondary school-
ing are less stable and significant only in a few specifications, partly reflecting the 
fact that secondary schooling is at 100 percent for several municipalities as Figure 1 
shows.19Across outcomes and specifications, we find an own marginal effect ( 2θ _ s ) 
19 We will see that the more efficient GMM estimator, which we present in the next subsection, consistently 
leads to more precise and statistically significant effects for secondary schooling as well. 
State capacity measured as: log of number of municipality state agencies
Prosperity equation
Not in poverty Secondary enrollment
OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM
Panel I (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
 d p i /d s i 0.520 0.342 0.353 0.314 0.515 0.178 0.223 0.314
(0.038) (0.141) (0.147) (0.041) (0.049) (0.179) (0.186) (0.041)
 d p i /d s j 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.036 0.035 0.035
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Panel II First stage for  s i 
2 
F-test for excluded instruments 31.01 35.06 30.46 35.70
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.670 0.655 0.675 0.662
First-stage linear model First stage for  N i (δ)s 
F-test for excluded instruments 524.6 522.1 579.3 583.1
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.769 0.770       0.771 0.773  
log population Control Control Instrum Instrum Control Control Instrum Instrum
Observations 975 975 975 963   965 965 965 963
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. All models include department fixed effects and the 
following vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual rainfall, distance to current high-
way, and a department capital dummy. Panel I reports the estimates of the prosperity equation for each of the four 
outcomes, and panel II reports the F-tests for joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stages for 
the instrumental variables models of columns 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, and 15. The life quality index is for 1998, the 
public utilities coverage (aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) is for 2002, the fraction of the population above the 
poverty line is for 2005, and the secondary enrollment rate is the 1992–2002 average. All prosperity outcomes are 
standardized. In the models reported in columns 2, 6, 10, and 14, log population is treated as exogenous. In the 
models reported in columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16, log population is instrumented using 1843 population. 
Models in columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 are estimated with GMM as a system together with those reported in column 
4 of Table 3. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for arbi-
trary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to the network structure as described 
in the text. For models with more than one endogenous right-hand-side variable, the F-test is corrected following 
Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Table 4A—Prosperity and Public Goods Structural Equation (Continued )
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that is an order of magnitude larger than the spillover effect.20 IV estimates are 
somewhat smaller than OLS estimates, and very similar regardless of whether log 
population is treated as exogenous or endogenous.21
C. System GMM
Separately estimating equations (11) and (12) is in general inefficient because the 
system of  J + 1 equations imposes several cross-equation restrictions due to their 
joint dependence on  θ ,  ϕ , and  δ . Moreover, the shape of the function  g( · ) , which 
determines the intercept of the best response as a function of the covariates,  x i , and 
historical variables,  c i , is unknown and we would like to estimate it more flexibly. 
To achieve these objectives, we estimate equations (11) and (12) as a system using 
a semi-parametric GMM approach building on Ichimura and Lee (1991). Following 
this methodology, we created moment conditions using the orthogonality of our 
20 The average spillover effect is computed as  γ   j   _ n i , where  _ n i is the average number of “weighted” neighbors 
of a municipality, with  f ij s as weights (the average of  _ n i across municipalities is  0.03 ). Because this spillover is on 
more than one municipality, in the quantitative exercise in Table 5 the partial equilibrium direct effect and spillovers 
are roughly of the same order of magnitude. 
21 In all specifications, at our estimated parameters, the uniqueness condition from Proposition 1 is comfortably 
satisfied. This still leaves the question of whether, for a different set of parameters, there might be multiple equilib-
ria and we may incorrectly estimate a parameter vector implying uniqueness. We believe this is unlikely, since our 
estimates are far from the values that would imply multiplicity, and as also noted in footnote 9, since  ϕ > 0 , the 
fairly natural condition that  κ i ≥ 0 , which we explicitly check from our GMM estimation in the next subsection 
(see Figure 3), is also sufficient to guarantee uniqueness. 
Table 4B—Prosperity and Public Goods Structural Equation
State capacity measured as: log of number of municipality employees
Prosperity equation
Life quality index Public utilities coverage
OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM
Panel I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 d p i /d s i 0.478 0.247 0.222 0.210 0.263 0.395 0.310 0.210
(0.023) (0.092) (0.090) (0.023) (0.022) (0.111) (0.103) (0.023)
 d p i /d s j 0.015 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.019
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Panel II First stage for  s i 
2 
F-test for excluded instruments 13.68 27.44 13.28 27.42
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.571 0.576 0.570 0.575
First-stage linear model First stage for  N i (δ)s 
F-test for excluded instruments 351.3 459.4 344.4 457.4
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.759 0.758       0.759 0.758  
log population Control Control Instrum Instrum Control Control Instrum Instrum
Observations 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,003   1,017 1,017 1,017 1,003
(Continued )
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instruments and the residuals in equations (11) and (12). Semi-parametric GMM 
estimation enables us to explicitly include the cross-equation restrictions, to allow 
for the network links to depend nonlinearly on topographic features, and to esti-
mate  g( · ) semi-parametrically.22 To identify  δ in this case, we include as  additional 
moment conditions the products of functions of geographic characteristics  d ij and 
22 Following Ichimura and Lee (1991), we use a flexible semi-parametric index-function approach to estimate 
g( · ) by constructing the conditional expectation of the unknown function using only the empirical distribution. To 
smooth out the distribution, we use a density kernel that gives greater weights to closer observations. In particular, 
we compute:








   K (  ( c i −  c j )  φ +  ( x i −  x j )  β  _______________ a n  ) 
  ,
where  K( · ) is the kernel taken to be the normal distribution in the baseline,  j denotes observations, and  i is the grid 
point. 
State capacity measured as: log of number of municipality employees
Prosperity equation
Not in poverty Secondary enrollment
OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM OLS IV IV
Sys. 
GMM
Panel I (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
 d p i /d s i 0.233 0.305 0.275 0.210 0.222 0.144 0.216 0.210
(0.021) (0.119) (0.111) (0.023) (0.025) (0.138) (0.133) (0.023)
 d p i /d s j 0.019 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.022 0.024
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Panel II First stage for  s i 
2 
F-test for excluded instruments 13.28 27.42 14.89 29.61
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.570 0.575 0.585 0.597
First-stage linear model First stage for  N i (δ)s 
F-test for excluded instruments 344.4 457.4 378.2 495.3
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.759 0.758       0.767 0.768  
log population Control Control Instrum Instrum Control Control Instrum Instrum
Observations 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,003   1,006 1,006 1,006 1,003
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. All models include department fixed effects and the 
following vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual rainfall, distance to current high-
way, and a department capital dummy. Panel I reports the estimates of the prosperity equation for each of the four 
outcomes, and panel II reports the F-tests for joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stages for 
the instrumental variables models of columns 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, and 15. The life quality index is for 1998, the 
public utilities coverage (aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) is for 2002, the fraction of the population above the 
poverty line is for 2005, and the secondary enrollment rate is the 1992–2002 average. All prosperity outcomes are 
standardized. In the models reported in columns 2, 6, 10, and 14, log population is treated as exogenous. In the 
models reported in columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16, log population is instrumented using 1843 population. 
Models in columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 are estimated with GMM as a system together with those reported in column 
8 of Table 3. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for arbi-
trary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to the network structure as described 
in the text. For models with more than one endogenous right-hand-side variable, the F-test is corrected following 
Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Table 4B—Prosperity and Public Goods Structural Equation (Continued )
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e ij (the average distance of each municipality to neighboring municipalities and 
the average variation in elevation along geodesics connecting municipality  i to its 
neighbors) with the residuals from the structural equations.23
For ease of comparison with our IV estimates, the (system) GMM estimates are 
also presented in Tables 3, 4A, and 4B. The results in column 4 of Table 3 are jointly 
estimated with the results of columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 of Table 4A, and column 8 
of Table 3 is jointly estimated with columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 of Table 4B. Marginal 
effects based on GMM estimates are remarkably similar to the linear IV estimates, 
but are more precise. This partly reflects the fact that by estimating the full system 
of five equations jointly, we are imposing the restriction that the coefficient of  s i 2 
is the same for all of our prosperity outcomes, leading to a gain in efficiency (and 
this explains why the estimate for the own effect is the same across columns in 
Tables 4A and 4B).24
Figure 3 presents our estimate of  g( c i  φ +  x i  β)/θ . Over most of its range, the 
function is very precisely estimated. Recall that in our model,  g i ( · ) =  κ i , is pro-
portional to the average effect of own state capacity on prosperity. The figures show 
that this function is positive for all its relevant range and is decreasing monotoni-
cally. Finally, online Appendix Figure 1 presents scatterplots of the observed and 
predicted values of the endogenous variables from the GMM estimates, which all 
depict a very good fit.
D. Counterfactuals
To assess the quantitative magnitudes of our estimates, Table 5 presents the 
results of a counterfactual experiment showing the implications of increasing local 
state presence in all municipalities below median local state presence to the median 
23 Letting  ψ = (θ, ϕ, γ, φ, β, ς,  β ̃ ,  ς ̃) , our semi-parametric system GMM estimator is given by
 min 
ψ, δ
    [ ∑ i=1
n
  Z i (δ)′  q i  (ψ, δ)]  
′ ( ∑ i=1
n
  Z i ( δ 0 )′  W ̂ i   Z i  ( δ 0 )) 
−1
 [  ∑ i=1
n
  Z i  (δ)′  q i  (ψ, δ)] , 
where  q i (ψ, δ) = [ ϵ i 1 , … ,  ϵ i J ,  ξ i ]  ′ ,  W ̂ i =  u ˆ i   u ˆ i ′ +  ∑ j=1 t  
t + 1 − j _____t + 1 + 20  ( Ω ij +  Ω ij ′ ) ,  Ω ij =  
 ∑ j∈ N  t (i)       f ij   u ˆ i   u ˆ j ′  ___________ | N t (i)|  ,  t is the high-
est network degree at which we truncate spatial correlation (in practice we allow spatial correlation between neigh-
bors and neighbors of neighbors),  u ˆ i s are vectors of residuals from the first-stage estimation given by  u ˆ i =  q i ( ψ 0 ,  δ 0 ) 
and  ( ψ 0 ,  δ 0 ) = arg  min ψ, δ  [ ∑ i=1 n  Z i (δ )  ′   q i (ψ, δ)]  ′ ( ∑ i=1 
n Z i (1)′  Z i (1)) −1 [ ∑ i=1 n   Z i  (δ)′  q i  (ψ, δ)] . Moreover,
 Z i  (δ) =  [  I J ⊗  z i 
p (δ) 0 
0
  z i BR (δ)
 ] 
is the matrix of instruments for observation  i ,  z i p (δ) is the vector of instruments for the prosperity equations, and 
 z i BR (δ) is the vector of instruments for the best response equation. These are exactly the same as the set of instru-
ments we used with the linear IV strategy in the previous subsection.
The analytic spatial correlation consistent asymptotic variance for this estimator is given by
 ( [ ∑ i=1
n
  Z i   ( δ ˆˆ)  
′   ∇ ψ, δ   q i ( ψ ˆ ˆ ,  δ ˆˆ) ]  
′ ( ∑ i=1
n
  Z i  ( δ 0 )′  W ̂ i   Z i  ( δ 0 )) 
−1
 [ ∑ i=1
n
  Z i   ( δ ˆˆ)  
′   ∇ γ, δ   q i   ( γ ˆˆ,  δ ˆˆ) ] ) 
−1
  . 
Notice that this estimator allows for both arbitrary spatial and cross-equation correlation. The choice of weights 
for the spatial correlation terms must be such that they approach  1 as  t → ∞ , and  ( ∑ i=1 n Z i ( δ 0 )′  W ̂ i   Z i ( δ 0 )) −1 is 
positive definite. 
24 The conditions for a unique equilibrium in Proposition 1 are again easily satisfied at our GMM estimates. 
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of the distribution. Panels IA and IB in the table present the results using the GMM 
estimates reported in this subsection (the third and fourth panels contain estimates 
from the general model and will be discussed in the next subsection). The first panel 
depicts the partial equilibrium effects (holding the response of other municipalities 
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Figure 3. Estimated  g( c i  φ +  x i  β) Function
Notes: The figure plots the GMM estimates of g( · ), the intercept of the best response equation. The left-hand-side 
panel presents the estimate for the model using municipality agencies as the measure of local state capacity. The 
right-hand-side panel presents the estimate for the model using municipality public employees as the measure of 
local state capacity. 
Table 5—Experiment: Implications of Moving All Municipalities  
below Median State Capacity to Median
Panel IA. Partial equilibrium change Panel IB. General equilibrium change
Fraction due to Fraction due to
Panel I. Linear model From To
Own 





Local agencies 10 10 10 20.6
Life quality index 48.0 49.0 53.4% 46.6% 48.0 58.2 9.8% 90.2%
Utilities coverage 53.3 57.2 51.7% 48.3% 53.3 73.7 18.9% 81.1%
Percent not in poverty 57.1 60.0 57.1% 43.0% 57.1 68.3 25.5% 74.5%
Secondary enrollment 56.6 59.2 45.5% 54.5% 56.6 82.4 10.1% 89.9%
Panel II. Nonlinear model 
(under SMM parameter estimates)
Panel IIA. Partial equilibrium change Panel IIB. General equilibrium change
From To From To
Local agencies 10 10 10 23.4
Life quality index 48.0 51.0 48.0 60.2
Utilities coverage 53.3 56.8 53.3 63.4
Percent not in poverty 57.1 61.8 57.1 71.3
Secondary enrollment 56.6 59.0 56.6 61.5
Notes: This table reports results from an experiment that takes all municipalities below median state capacity to the 
median, using the estimated parameters of the models measuring state capacity as the number of local state agen-
cies. Panel I reports the medians of the empirical and counterfactual distributions using the structural parameters 
of the linear model estimated with GMM as a system. Panel II reports the medians of the empirical and counterfac-
tual distributions using the structural parameters of the nonlinear model estimated with SMM. Panels IA and IIA 
report the medians for the partial equilibrium exercise where municipalities’ best responses are held fixed. Panels IB 
and IIB report the full equilibrium responses (when all municipalities best respond to the increase in state capacity 
among the municipalities below median state capacity). The life quality index is for 1998, the public utilities cover-
age (aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) is for 2002, the fraction of the population above the poverty line is for 2005, 
and the secondary enrollment rate is the 1992–2002 average.
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fraction of the population above poverty, utilities coverage, and secondary school 
enrollment. For example, the median fraction of the population above poverty 
increases from  57 percent to  60 percent. The table also indicates that about  57 per-
cent of this is due to direct effects, so that spillover effects are not implausibly large, 
though still sizable. The second panel then factors in the full equilibrium responses 
through network effects. Now the quantitative magnitudes are much larger—reflect-
ing the positive responses due to strategic complementarities. For example, the 
median fraction above poverty now rises to  68 percent, implying that the network 
effects are now 5–10 times as large as the own effects. This is indicative of the 
importance of network effects in this setting.
E. Falsification Exercises
We now report two falsification exercises, supporting the validity of the exclu-
sion restrictions used in our analysis so far. The first exercise, reported in Table 6, 
investigates whether own and neighbors’ local state presence is correlated with two 
outcomes, primary school enrollment and vaccination coverage. The Colombian 
Table 6—Placebo Exercise: Nationally Determined Prosperity  
and Public Goods Outcomes Structural Equation
State capacity measured Number of municipality state agencies Number of municipality employees









OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 d p i /d s i −0.049 0.198 0.015 0.260 −0.007 0.355 0.013 0.134
(0.051) (0.207) (0.046) (0.199) (0.027) (0.154) (0.025) (0.143)
 d p i /d s j 0.001 −0.002 0.004 −0.002 0.000 −0.011 −0.002 −0.005
  (0.005) (0.007)   (0.005) (0.008)   (0.003) (0.007)   (0.003) (0.006)
Panel II First stage for  s i 
2 
F-test for excluded instruments 36.41 35.06 29.33 27.42
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.663 0.655 0.597 0.575
First stage for  N i (δ)s 
F-test for excluded instruments 585.0 522.1 490.5 457.4
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.773     0.770   0.768     0.758
Observations 963 963   975 975   1,004 1,004   1,017 1,017
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. All models include department fixed effects and the fol-
lowing vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual rainfall, distance to current highway, 
and a department capital dummy. Columns 1–4 report estimates for models using the number of municipality agen-
cies as the measure of state capacity, and columns 5–8 report estimates for models using the number of municipality 
employees as the measure of state capacity. Panel I reports the estimates of the prosperity equation for each of the 
two placebo outcomes, and panel II reports the F-tests for joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first 
stages for the instrumental variables models of columns 2, 4, 6, and 8. The primary enrollment rate is the 1992–2002 
average, and vaccination coverage is for 1998. All prosperity outcomes are standardized. In the models reported in 
columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, log population is instrumented using 1843 population. Standard errors reported in parenthe-
ses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary spatial correlation within the network following 
Conley (1999), adapted to the network structure as described in the text. For models with more than one endoge-
nous right-hand-side variable, the F-test is corrected following Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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Constitution mandates universal primary school enrollment, and the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1 show the very high average levels of primary enrollment and 
the small variation across municipalities. Vaccination efforts, on the other hand, 
are directly operated by the Ministry of Health. Because of their highly centralized 
control, we expect that these two aspects of local public goods should not depend as 
much—or at all—on local state capacity.25 The results in Table 6 indicate that these 
variables are indeed unaffected by own and neighbors’ local state presence, bolster-
ing our confidence in the exclusion restrictions and the estimates reported so far.
The second exercise, reported in Table 7, examines whether the reduced-form 
correlation between neighbors’ historical variables (colonial state presence and royal 
roads) and current prosperity outcomes, which is at the root of our main findings, 
may reflect persistent unobservables affecting historical and current prosperity or the 
very persistent effects of early location of the colonial state on prosperity. In particu-
lar, we would like to rule out the possibility that our historical variables impacted his-
torical prosperity, which then persisted and affected both current local state presence 
and current prosperity. Data on literacy and school enrollment from the 1918 national 
census, which are available for around  70 percent of the municipalities in our sample, 
are useful to shed light on these concerns. The extreme absence of the state from 
much of Colombia before the 1930s and the fact that systematic reliance on local 
state capacity for public goods provision was initiated with the decentralization of 
the mid-1980s and especially the 1991 Constitution imply that under our hypothe-
sis—that our estimates measure the effect of contemporary local state presence on 
public goods and prosperity today—we should not find a strong correlation between 
neighbors’ historical variables and our literacy and school enrollment data for 1918. 
Table 7 confirms this. The top panel of the table presents the key reduced-form rela-
tionship underlying our IV estimates in Tables 4A and 4B between our four key pros-
perity outcomes and the excluded instruments in these tables (but focusing on the 
sample of 683 municipalities with the historical data on prosperity). Consistent with 
the results presented so far, there is a strong and robust positive relationship between 
neighbors’ state presence and current prosperity. The pattern in the bottom panel, 
which presents analogous reduced-form estimates for the 1918 outcomes, is quite 
different, however. Though a few of the estimates have a similar size, they often have 
the opposite of the expected sign and none are statistically significant. This pattern is 
reassuring and supports our interpretation that the effects of colonial state presence 
and royal roads variables on current prosperity and public goods provision are work-
ing primarily through current, or at the very least recent, presence of the local state.
F. Specification Tests
Table 8 presents OLS and IV results from a misspecified but simpler model where 
own state capacity enters linearly. This is similar to the type of equation estimated 
in most of the rest of the peer effects literature. The estimates reported in Table 8 
are still significant and quantitatively very comparable to those in Table 4 (e.g., with 
state capacity measured with the number of agencies, the estimates in Table 4 are 
25 The main reason why they might still depend on local state capacity is that the lack of local capacity may 
hinder the efforts of the national state or thwart its clear directives. 
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between  0.23 and  0.56 , while those in Table 8 are between  0.1 and  0.36 ). This sug-
gests that both our general qualitative and specific quantitative aspects are not overly 
dependent on functional forms.26
26 The results are no longer similar, however, if one were to try to directly estimate equation (1) including 
the cross effects, i.e., the term  ϕ  s i   N i  (δ)s , to infer  ϕ as well as the own and the spillover effects. This difference 
is exactly what our theory predicts: given the form of the equilibrium summarized by equations (11) and (12), it 
Table 7—Placebo Exercise: Current versus Historical Prosperity










OLS OLS OLS OLS
Panel I (1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors’ colonial state officials −0.286 −0.521 0.192 0.349
(0.403) (0.400) (0.499) (0.570)
Neighbors’ colonial state agencies 1.779 1.316 1.819 1.654
(0.540) (0.564) (0.526) (0.757)
Neighbors’ distance to royal roads −1.352 −1.645 −0.800 −1.634
  (0.362) (0.342) (0.307) (0.473)
F-test for joint significance of instruments 12.53 10.26 7.59 9.38
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Control for log population Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 683 683 683 683
Correlation between historical (1918) prosperity and instruments
Reduced form
Literacy rate in 1918 Schooling rate in 1918
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Panel II (1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors’ colonial state officials 0.719 0.837 −0.579 −0.541
(0.522) (0.519) (0.569) (0.581)
Neighbors’ colonial state agencies −0.479 −0.545 1.553 1.532
(0.697) (0.692) (0.936) (0.945)
Neighbors’ distance to royal roads −0.350 −0.377 −0.383 −0.392
  (0.654) (0.646) (0.696) (0.697)
F-test for joint significance of instruments 0.98 1.25 1.57 1.56
F-test p-value 0.401 0.289 0.194 0.197
Control for historical 1843 population No Yes No Yes
Observations 683 683 683 683
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. Panel I reports the estimates of a reduced-form regres-
sion of the four prosperity outcomes on neighbors’ colonial state, and panel II reports the estimates of a reduced 
form regression of the historical (1918) prosperity outcomes on neighbors’ colonial state. Models in panel I include 
department fixed effects and the following vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual 
rainfall, distance to current highway, and a department capital dummy. Models in panel II do not control for the dis-
tance to a current highway. In the models of columns 2 and 4 in panel II, historical (1843) population is included as 
an additional control. All prosperity outcomes are standardized. All models use the restricted sample of municipali-
ties for which 1918 data is available. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedastic-
ity and allow for arbitrary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to the network 
structure as described in the text.
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should not be possible to estimate the own and cross effects separately by estimating (1), so we find this result 
reassuring. 
Table 8—Prosperity and Public Goods “Naïve” Equation
State capacity measured as log of number of municipality state agencies
Prosperity equation (linear on  s i )
Life quality index Public util. coverage Not in poverty Secondary enrollment
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel IA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
d p i /d s i 0.669 0.145 0.556 0.360 0.457 0.199 0.426 0.106(0.044) (0.096) (0.035) (0.083) (0.038) (0.096) (0.051) (0.118)
d p i /d s j 0.015 0.031 0.021 0.024 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.038(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Panel IB First stage on  s i 
F-test for excluded instruments 65.40 65.17 65.17 67.70
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.427 0.426 0.426 0.429
First stage on  N i (δ)s 
F-test for excluded instruments 625.5 625.9 625.9 678.5
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.770   0.770   0.770   0.773
Observations 973 973 975 975 975 975 965 965
State capacity measured as log of number of municipality employees
Prosperity equation (linear on  s i )
 Life quality index Public util. coverage Not in poverty Secondary enrollment
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel IIA (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
d p i /d s i 0.465 0.112 0.288 0.279 0.240 0.196 0.216 0.143(0.024) (0.069) (0.022) (0.067) (0.023) (0.074) (0.028) (0.092)
d p i /d s j 0.014 0.025 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.024(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Panel IIB First stage on  s i 
F-test for excluded instruments   44.88 44.61 44.61 47.97
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2 0.438 0.437 0.437 0.451
First stage on  N i (δ)s 
F-test for excluded instruments   529.0 526.9 526.9 571.5
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage R2   0.758   0.758   0.758   0.768
Observations 1,014 1,014 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,006 1,006
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. All models include department fixed effects and the 
following vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual rainfall, distance to a current high-
way, and a department capital dummy. Panels IA and IIA report the estimates of a linear-in-state-capacity pros-
perity equation for each of the four outcomes, and panels IIA and IIB report the F-tests for joint significance of 
the excluded instruments in the first stages for the instrumental variables models of all even-numbered columns. 
Models in panel IA use the log number of state agencies as the measure of state capacity. Models in panel IIA use 
the log number of municipality employees as the measure of state capacity. The life quality index is for 1998, the 
public utilities coverage (aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) is for 2002, the fraction of the population above the 
poverty line is for 2005, and the secondary enrollment rate is the 1992–2002 average. All prosperity outcomes are 
standardized. In all models reported in even-numbered columns, log population is instrumented using 1843 popu-
lation. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary spa-
tial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to the network structure as described in the 
text. For models with more than one endogenous right-hand-side variable, the F-test is corrected following Angrist 
and Pischke (2009).
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Table 9 presents the correlation coefficients between the residuals from the esti-
mates of equations (11) and (12) and three commonly-used measures of network 
centrality, the betweenness and the Bonacich centrality statistics, and the local clus-
tering coefficient (Jackson 2008). Since the equilibrium levels of state capacity in 
our game are functions of the centrality measures (e.g., Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, 
and Zenou 2006; Bramoulle, Kranton, and D’Amours 2014), misspecification is 
likely to lead to a correlation between residuals and these centrality measures. 
Table 9 shows that there is essentially no correlation between these variables.
G. Robustness
Online Appendix B, Tables 1–10 show that our results are also robust to a series 
of variations. For brevity, we focus on linear IV estimates of equation (12) for our 
four prosperity outcomes. In panel I of online Appendix Table 1 we estimate the 
model without controlling for the distance to a current highway, which is a useful 
robustness check against the potential endogeneity of the location of current high-
ways. In panel II, we control for a range of additional geographic covariates, includ-
ing the density of primary, secondary, and tertiary rivers, and the full distribution of 
land by quality and type as described in Section III. The results in this table are quite 
similar to our baseline estimates.
Table 9—Specification Test: Correlations between Residuals and Network Centrality Statistics

















Betweeness centrality −0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
[0.199] [0.710] [0.993] [0.669] [0.642]
Bonacich centrality 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
[0.283] [0.305] [0.670] [0.769] [0.394]
Local clustering 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03
[0.020] [0.861] [0.116] [0.527] [0.326]
p-value of F-test for 
 joint significance
[0.080] [0.506] [0.278] [0.550] [0.338]

















Betweeness centrality −0.005 0.012 −0.012 0.002 0.015
[0.874] [0.714] [0.711] [0.947] [0.632]
Bonacich centrality 0.038 0.040 −0.016 −0.012 0.029
[0.239] [0.210] [0.626] [0.717] [0.356]
Local clustering 0.076 −0.005 0.050 0.032 0.022
[0.017] [0.878] [0.118] [0.317] [0.487]
p-value of F-test for 
 joint significance
[0.071] [0.463] [0.358] [0.507] [0.393]
Notes: This table reports the correlation coefficients between the residuals of the benchmark IV models in column 3 
of Table 3, and columns 3, 7, 11, and 15 of Table 4A (panel I), and in column 7 of Table 3, and columns 3, 7, 11, and 
15 of Table 4B (panel II), with the betweenness centrality, the Bonacich centrality network, and the local clustering 
statistics. The associated p-values are in square brackets. The table also reports p-values of the F-tests for joint sig-
nificance of the three network centrality statistics in a regression of the residuals on these statistics.
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Online Appendix Table 2 presents robustness exercises related to the network 
structure itself. In panel I we combine our IV strategy with Bramoulle, Djebbari, 
and Fortin’s (2009) approach of using neighbors of neighbors’ characteristics. If our 
historical instruments were potentially spatially correlated but our specification of 
the network captured the full set of spillovers, using the third-degree neighbors’ his-
torical variables as instruments (instead of our benchmark first and second-degree 
neighbors’ historical variables) would lead to consistent estimates—even though 
our baseline estimates may have been biased. In panel II we present the results of 
redefining the meaning of a link, by considering both adjacent and second-degree 
adjacent municipalities as connected to check whether allowing longer-range spill-
overs has a meaningful impact on our results. Finally, in panel III we allow for links 
to exist between every pair of municipalities with decaying link strength according 
to matrix  F . Reassuringly, in all three cases, the results are very similar to our base-
line estimates (if anything, they become more precisely estimated).
In online Appendix Table 3 we look at the sensitivity of our estimates to using 
subsets of our colonial state presence instruments. In panel I we exclude all func-
tions of distance to royal roads from the instrument set, and in panel II we only use 
neighbors’ distance to the royal roads as instruments. As anticipated by the over-
identification tests reported above, our estimates remain quite stable. In addition, 
when only the royal roads instruments are used, we can see more transparently 
that neighbors’ distance to royal roads is significant with the right sign in the best 
response equation. In panel III we use only a quadratic rather than a quartic in our 
historical variables as instruments for the nonlinear outcome equation. Standard 
errors in this case are slightly larger but the results are still quite similar to our 
baseline estimates.
Online Appendix Tables 4–6 further probe the sensitivity of our results to func-
tional form restrictions. In online Appendix Table 4 we include additional quadratic 
terms in (1). This has little effect on the implied quantitative magnitudes, and the 
quadratic effects of neighbors’ state capacity themselves flip signs across outcomes, 
and are insignificant in six out of the eight specifications. Online Appendix Table 5 
includes additional contextual effects from covariates of neighbors in the best 
response equation (i.e., adding  N i (δ)x on the right-hand side of (2)). This implies 
that we can only use the historical characteristics of neighbors of neighbors as 
instruments. The results from this exercise are also very similar to our baseline esti-
mates. Online Appendix Table 6 presents results from including contextual effects 
on the prosperity equation (neighbors’ geographic variables), which again have lit-
tle impact on our estimates of own or spillover effects.
Another concern is that some areas of Colombia have been under the control of 
guerrillas and paramilitaries, creating a general lawlessness, potentially reducing 
the effectiveness of the local and national state in these areas. In online Appendix 
Table 7, we show that our results are not driven by municipalities most likely to 
suffer from such lawlessness. Excluding municipalities with historically high lev-
els of violence as measured by paramilitary attacks during the 1998–2004 period 
from our sample (panel I) or from the network entirely (panel II) leaves our results 
largely unchanged.
A related concern is the role of capital cities as the source of spillovers. To show 
that our results are not driven by capital cities, online Appendix Table 8 presents the 
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 estimates of the prosperity equation without these cities, which are very similar to 
the baseline.
Online Appendix Table 9 makes an attempt at unbundling our measures of 
local state agencies. We separate them into four distinct types: health-related, 
regulation-related, services-related, and education-related. We then reestimate 
the best response equation for each subset of agencies. Reassuringly, we find 
not only similar strategic complementarities to our baseline results, but also 
that each dimension of state capacity appears to be responding to variation 
in neighbors’ state capacity in the same dimension (e.g., health-related agencies 
respond positively to health-related agencies of neighbors, not to other agencies 
of neighbors).
H. Controlling for National Bureaucracy
As a preparation for the results in the next section, in Tables 10 and 11 we also 
control for the national state’s employees (bureaucrats). In our baseline estimates, 
these employees are effectively included in the error term and if they are correlated 
with our instruments, this could lead to inconsistent estimates. The results are very 
similar to our baseline, and are in fact more precisely estimated, which is plausible 
as the omission of national bureaucracy from our baseline models likely created 
additional residual variance.
Table 10—Contemporary State Equilibrium Best Response
Controlling for national-level bureaucracy
Equilibrium best response equation







d s i /d s j 0.018 0.017
(0.003) (0.001)
d s i /d(colonial state official s i ) 0.102 0.002
(0.030) (0.007)
d s i /d(colonial state agencie s i ) −0.014 0.010
(0.032) (0.008)
d s i /d(distance to royal road s i ) 0.008 −0.010
(0.020) (0.004)
Observations 975 1,017
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects of the best response equation. All 
models include department fixed effects and in addition to the number of national-level public 
employees, the following vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation, annual 
rainfall, distance to a current highway, and a department capital dummy. Column 1 uses the log 
number of local state agencies as the measure of state capacity, and column 2 uses the log num-
ber of municipality employees as the measure of state capacity. The first stages of the instru-
mental variables models are omitted. Log population is instrumented using 1843 population. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for 
arbitrary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to the net-
work structure as described in the text.
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V. General Case
In this section, we turn to the general model which relaxes the assumption that 
α = 1 and reintroduces endogenous choices by the national state. Our objective is 
to estimate whether national and local state capacities are complements or substi-
tutes and investigate whether fully allowing for the endogenous determination of 
national state capacity affects the extent of direct and spillover effects of state capac-
ity. The reason why we view those presented in the previous section as our main 
results is that estimates from this more general model lead to very similar qualitative 
and quantitative patterns.
A. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy relies on the same historical sources of variation (and 
same exclusion restrictions), but combines them with the first-order conditions of 
our more general model. In this case, we have two sets of first-order conditions, 
Table 11—Robustness Exercises: Prosperity and Public Goods Outcomes Structural Equation
Controlling for national-level bureaucracy
Prosperity equation
 log of number of municipality state agencies
Life quality index Utilities coverage Not in poverty Secondary enroll.
IV IV IV IV
Panel I (1) (2) (3) (4)
d p i /d s i 0.520 0.685 0.441 0.274
(0.107) (0.122) (0.134) (0.170)
d p i /d s j 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.032
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 973 975 975 965
Prosperity equation
log of number of municipality employees
Life quality index Utilities coverage Not in poverty Secondary enroll.
IV IV IV IV
Panel II (5) (6) (7) (8)
d p i /d s i 0.320 0.541 0.355 0.238
(0.080) (0.096) (0.102) (0.133)
d p i /d s j 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.021
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 1,014 1,017 1,017 1,006
Notes: All reported estimates are average marginal effects. All models include department fixed effects and in addi-
tion to the number of national-level public employees, the following vector of controls: longitude, latitude, surface 
area, elevation, annual rainfall, distance to a current highway, and a department capital dummy. Panel I uses the log 
number of local state agencies as the measure of state capacity, and panel II uses the log number of municipality 
employees as the measure of state capacity. The first stages of the instrumental variables models are omitted. Log 
population is instrumented using 1843 population. The life quality index is for 1998, the public utilities coverage 
(aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) is for 2002, the fraction of the population above the poverty line is for 2005, 
and the secondary enrollment rate is the 1992–2002 average. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), 
adapted to the network structure as described in the text.
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one for the national state, corresponding to equation (8) in the general model, and 
the other for the local state, corresponding to equation (7). The national state’s 
 first-order condition is
(13)   h b  ( l i ,  p i ,  b i | ζ) ≡ (1 − α)  [  s i  __ b i] 
 1 __σ ×
    { θ __ α  ζ i   l i[  l i __  s i ] 
 1 __σ +  N i (δ) [ (ϕ s +  1 __J  ∑ j 
 
 γ   j  ι) ∗ ζ] } − η  b i = 0,  
while the local state’s first-order condition now becomes
(14)  h ξ ( l i ,  p i ,  b i) ≡  θ __ α  l i [  l i  __ s i ] 
 1 __σ − ϕ  N i  (δ)s − g( c i  φ +  x i  β) −  ς   i D = 0,  
where  ι is a column vector of 1s, and overall state capacity  s i is defined as in equa-
tion (4). In addition, we rewrite the prosperity equation (1), in this case after substi-
tuting for  κ i   s i + ϕ  s i   N i  (δ)s from (14):
(15)  h  ϵ   j  ( l i,  p i ,  b i) ≡  p i j −  θ __ α  l i  s i [  l i __  s i ] 
 1 __σ −  γ    j   N i  (δ)s −  x i   β ̃ j −  ς ̃   i jD = 0 . 
These three equations summarize the moment conditions for the general model. 
They show that this general model is identified up to a scaling ( η is not separately 
identified from  α ) and  α = 1 makes the first-order condition of the national state, 
(13), vanish. However, the parameters  α and  σ can be identified from equations (14) 
and (15). Motivated by this observation, we first take the national state’s choices as 
predetermined and estimate these parameters based only on the variation coming 
from equations (14) and (15). We then estimate the entire system (13)–(15), by 
imposing the CES parameter estimates from the first step.
B. GMM with Predetermined National Choices
When national state capacity choices, the  b i s, are treated as predetermined in the 
network game between municipalities, the model reduces to equations (14) and (15). 
Then, conditional on the  b i s, these equations can be estimated straightforwardly by 
GMM. The GMM estimator is analogous to the one we utilized in the previous sec-
tion (see footnote 23), with the difference that the moment condition implied by the 
best response equation is now given by (14).
The GMM estimates are reported in the first column of Table 12. To compute 
standard errors, we again use the spatial correlation consistent variance-covariance 
estimator in footnote 23. The table presents the estimates when we use the num-
ber of state agencies as our measure of state capacity. The elasticity of substitution 
between local and national state,  σ , is estimated as  0.11 (standard error  = 0.006 
). This implies that local and national state presence are highly complementary 
inputs:  α is estimated to be  0.90 (standard error  = 0.013 ), and the estimate for the 
interaction effect  ϕ indicates that local state capacity choices are again strategic 
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complements and the magnitude of strategic complementarities is very similar to 
that in the linear model. The table also presents the average effect of own state 
capacity on public goods and prosperity,  κ i , and its standard deviation, recovered 
from the estimation of the function  g( c i  φ +  x i  β) .27
27 The condition for uniqueness in Proposition 1 is again comfortably satisfied. In particular, we have 
1 +  1 ________  λ min (N(δ)) = −3.25 < min  { ( ∂  l i  ______ ∂   N i (δ)s) 
−1
 } = 0.006 < max  { ( ∂  l i  ______ ∂   N i (δ)s) 
−1
 } = 0.244 < 1 .  
Table 12—Stuctural Parameter Estimates
National-level state capacity Predetermined  Endogenous




γ (Life quality index) 0.870 1.017
(0.114) (0.119)
γ (Public utilities) 0.933 1.087
(0.101) (0.105)
γ (Not in poverty) 0.738 0.937
(0.086) (0.083)








π1 (Historical electoral variability) 0.540
(0.071)
π2 (Betweenness centrality) 0.318
(0.251)
π3 (Bonacich centrality) −0.268
(0.069)








Notes: The table reports structural parameter estimates of the nonlinear model, using the log of 
the number of municipality agencies as the measure of local state capacity. Column 1 presents 
the parameters of the model estimated with GMM as a system that takes national-level state 
capacity as predetermined. Column 2 presents the SMM estimates of the model where national 
state capacity is endogenous. The estimates of the CES parameters, α and σ, reported at the 
bottom are estimated separately by GMM taking national state capacity choices as predeter-
mined. Analytic standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
allow for arbitrary spatial correlation within the network following Conley (1999), adapted to 
the network structure as described in the text. Estimates in square brackets are standard devia-
tions across the sample of municipalities.
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C. Estimation of the Full Model by Simulated Method of Moments
We next estimate the full model given by equations (13), (14), and (15). Relative 
to the estimates in the previous subsection, this involves imposing the additional 
restrictions that national state capacities satisfy the first-order condition as given in 
equation (8).
Because national state’s weights, the  ζ i s, are unobserved, we model them as a 
function of a vector of observable characteristics related to within-network central-
ity of the municipalities, political variables, and an unobserved component,
  ζ i = exp ( v i  π +  ω i ) . 
In addition to a constant,  v i here includes four variables: the three network centrality 
statistics already used in Table 9, the betweenness centrality, the Bonacich central-
ity, and the local clustering coefficient, as well as a proxy for the extent of historical 
political competitiveness of the municipality, which we measure as the standard 
deviation of the Liberal Party’s elections share across the 1974–1994 presidential 
elections.
Because the national state’s first-order conditions involve the full vector of 
unobserved weights for each municipality, we use a simulated method of moments 
(SMM) estimator derived from the moment conditions implied by (13), (14), and 
(15). The SMM estimator is similar to our GMM estimator, except that we have 
 q i  ( ψ , δ) =  [ h  ϵ 1  ( l i ,  p i ,  b i), … ,  h  ϵ   J  ( l i ,  p i ,  b i),  h ξ ( l i ,  p i ,  b i),  h ˆ b ( l i ,  p i ,  b i)]  ′  , where









 0  z i BR (δ) 0






Here  z i NL (δ) is a vector of instruments for the national state’s best response equation, 
including  v i ,  x i , historical population, average distance to neighboring municipali-
ties, and average variability of altitude along geodesics to neighboring municipali-
ties. We write the average (simulated) national state’s first-order condition as
  h ˆ b ( l i ,  p i ,  b i) =  ∫     h b ( l i ,  p i ,  b i | ω)  f ω (ω) dω .
In this equation  f ω ( · ) is the joint density of the unobserved component of the national 
state’s random weights, and the vector  ψ now also includes  η and  π . Notice that the 
full vector of weights is assumed to be known to all players, so this is still a game of 
complete information. We also restrict the  ζ i s to be nonnegative and in our bench-
mark assume that  f ω ( · ) is a standard normal (our results are robust to using various 
different densities). This procedure allows us to estimate the national state’s weights 
very precisely.
Estimates for the general model, when measuring local state capacity as the num-
ber of state agencies, are presented in the second column of Table 12. The magni-
tudes of the parameter estimates are remarkably close to the GMM estimates under 
predetermined national state capacity choices. They also imply that the national 
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state’s weights, the  ζ i s, are fairly skewed, with a mean of  1.95 , a median of  0.93 , 
and a standard deviation of  3.66 . This squares well with the idea that the Colombian 
national state has been narrowly focused on a few areas of the country, leaving large 
swathes of it unattended. In addition, the parameter vector  π is estimated precisely, 
suggesting that a large part of the variation in the national state’s weights across 
municipalities reflects local characteristics of municipalities. In particular, the net-
work characteristics and the historical political competitiveness of municipalities 
are strong predictors of national weights, and have a significant impact on the vari-
ation in national state’s choices.
Throughout, the quantitative magnitudes of the estimates are very similar to 
those from the linear model. For example, the average slope of the best response 
equation  (the average  ∂  l i  __∂  l j   |   h ξ  from equation (14)) for our SMM estimates is 0.013, 
compared to the average slopes of the linear best response reported in Table 4, 
which are between  0.016 and  0.022 . Similarly, the average own effect in the pros-
perity equation  (the average  ∂  p i  __∂  l i   |   h ϵ  from equation (15)) is  0.21 , as compared to our 
system GMM estimate for the linear model of  0.39 reported in the first row of 
Table 4A. Finally, the average spillover effects in the prosperity equations  ( ∂  p i  ___∂  l j   |   h ϵ  ) 
are  (0.020, 0.022, 0.019, 0.027) for the life quality index, utilities coverage, frac-
tion above the poverty line, and secondary school enrollment rates, respectively, 
which are also close to the corresponding estimates in the second row of Table 4A, 
lying between  0.02 and  0.035 .
We perform the same counterfactual exercise as in the top two panels of Table 5 
and the results are reported in the next two panels of Table 5. Because the best 
responses are nonlinear, we cannot simply use the estimated parameters (and shocks) 
to predict the equilibrium outcomes, and need to numerically solve for the equilib-
rium state capacities to implement this counterfactual experiment. We accomplish 
this using a Newton-Raphson approximation, and then compute the implied values 
for  p i using equation (15). The bottom two panels of Table 5 show that the quanti-
tative results are close to those we obtain from the linear model (with  α = 1 ). This 
is the basis of the statement above that the qualitative and quantitative results from 
this general model are similar to those from the linear model.
We next perform two counterfactual exercises related to implications of changes 
in national state capacity. First, in online Appendix Table 10 we investigate the 
implications of increasing all  b i s below the median to the median value. In contrast 
to the counterfactual experiment in which local state capacity levels were similarly 
increased, the implied magnitudes are now smaller. The more limited effects of a 
change in national state capacity are because of the relatively lower dispersion of the 
distribution of national state capacity in the data and because of the smaller response 
of local state capacity to these changes. They reiterate that it is local state capacity 
that is more important for various local prosperity outcomes in Colombian munici-
palities, justifying our greater emphasis on local state presence.
Second, in online Appendix Table 11, we consider reducing the skewness (asym-
metry) of the weights the national state attaches to different municipalities by 
increasing all  ζ i s below the median to the estimated median value. This reduction in 
skewness, reducing the asymmetry of the weights of different municipalities in the 
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national state’s preferences, leads to similar aggregate gains. For example, we see a 
3.3 percent increase in the median fraction of population above the poverty line, and 
a  2 percent increase in median secondary school enrollment rates. Thus we find that 
the effect of equalizing the national weights in this way has similar implications to 
directly equalizing national state capacities.
VI. Implications for Optimal Policy
Our structural estimates allow us to provide some preliminary insights on optimal 
policy, in particular for the optimal allocation of state capacity across municipali-
ties. For this exercise, suppose that the objective is to maximize average prosperity 
across municipalities. We thus consider the problem of maximizing the popula-
tion-weighted sum of utilities by reshuffling local state capacity across municipal-
ities (and taking into account the full equilibrium responses of all municipalities). 
Because we are focusing on a pure reallocation (and ignoring costs of reallocation 
and differences in relative prices across municipalities), there are no costs in this 
policy. Mathematically, the problem is
  max e≥0   { ∑ i 
 
   w i  1 _J  ∑ j 
 
   p i j (s)} 
subject to  ∑ i      e i = 0 , and
  s =  (I −  ϕ __θ N(δ)) 
−1
 ( 1 __θ κ + e) , 
where  e denotes the vector of changes (reallocation) in state capacity, and the  w i s are 
population weights. In Appendix A we show that this problem has an explicit-form 
solution, where the optimal  e is a function of centrality statistics of the network. 
Panel I in Table 13 presents the average changes in our prosperity outcomes under 
the optimal reallocation of local public employees. Average utilities coverage would 
increase by 4.5 percentage points, the poverty rate would be 3.5 percentage points 
lower, and secondary school enrollment rates would be 5.6 percentage points higher. 
These are quite significant changes.
Figure 4 shows the change in the distribution of our four prosperity outcomes fol-
lowing the optimal reallocation of state capacity, documenting both the increase in 
average prosperity and the compression in the distributions—both of these resulting 
from greater state capacity now allocated to the poorest municipalities.
The solution in equation (A1) in Appendix A shows that the optimal reallocation 
is a function of eigenvector centrality. To make the relationship between  e and net-
work position more explicit, we ran a set of regressions of our estimated  e on the 
same three network statistics used above—betweenness centrality, Bonacich cen-
trality, and local clustering—as well as historical population and our benchmark set 
of controls. Online Appendix Table 12 presents the results. Our three network statis-
tics are strong predictors of  e , both when we use state agencies (columns 1–4) and 
municipality employees (columns 5–8). Furthermore, the R2s of these regressions 
are quite high (around 0.8) in all specifications, highlighting the key role played by 
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the network structure in the determination of the distribution of prosperity across 
municipalities.
Finally, we also perform a similar policy exercise with the general model. Because 
in this case there is no explicit-form characterization of the optimal reallocation, we 
use the estimates from the regressions of the optimal allocation on network cen-
trality statistics presented in online Appendix Table 12 to generate predicted values 
for the  e i s. We then compute numerically the Nash equilibrium starting from this 
allocation, and obtain estimates of the predicted prosperity outcomes. We present 
the results of this exercise in the bottom panel of Table 13 using the number of state 
agencies as our measure of local state capacity. The magnitude of the changes is 
very similar to that from the linear model, even if larger for average and smaller 
for median changes. This is because in the general model the optimal reallocation 
of state capacity induces further equilibrium responses by both the local and the 
national levels, amplifying changes among richer municipalities (but also having 
somewhat smaller effects among poorer municipalities). The three bottom rows then 
present the equilibrium changes in prosperity outcomes when we depart from the 
optimal linear policy by making either one of the network centrality statistics  25 per-
cent more important in the linear model estimated in online Appendix Table 12. This 
exercise leads to very small changes in prosperity, showing that welfare in the gen-
eral model is very flat around the optimal policy from the linear model.
Table 13—Normative Exercise: Welfare Gains from an Optimal Reallocation of State Capacity
Experiment: Reallocation of municipality state capacity 
according to the optimal policy
Panel I. Linear model Average equilibrium change in










Average change (percentage points) 1.66 3.56 2.08 4.32
Median change (percentage points) 1.40 3.03 1.81 3.49
Panel II. General model Average equilibrium change in










Average change (percentage points) 2.62 5.88 3.75 6.72
Median change (percentage points) 0.12 0.42 0.12 0.86
Difference relative to prosperity under optimal policy from the linear model when increasing 
 by 25% the coefficient on (percentage points): 
 Betweenness −0.008 −0.015 −0.016 −0.020
 Bonacich −0.008 −0.017 −0.010 −0.020
 Local clustering −0.015 −0.034 −0.020 −0.050
Notes: This table reports the average and median equilibrium changes (after municipalities have best responded to 
the shock) in each prosperity outcome across the sample of municipalities of an experiment that reallocates munic-
ipality state capacity optimally according to equation (A1) using the parameters estimated with GMM as a system. 
Panel I presents the experiment results on the linear model using the number of municipality public employees as 
the measure of local state capacity. Panel II presents the results from using the optimal policy from the linear model 
in the general model, using the number of municipality agencies as the measure of local state capacity. The three 
bottom rows present the equilibrium change in prosperity outcomes when we increase the weight of each one of 
the three network centrality statistics in the linear model estimated in online Appendix Table A12 by 25 percent. 
The life quality index is for 1998, the public utilities coverage (aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) is for 2002, the 
fraction of the population above the poverty line is for 2005, and the secondary enrollment rate is the 1992−2002 
average.
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VII. Conclusions
In this paper we developed a framework for estimating the direct and spillover 
effects of local state capacity, and applied it in the Colombian context. We modeled 
the determination of local and national state capacity as a network game, where each 
municipality, anticipating the choices and spillovers created by other municipalities 
and the decisions of the national state, invests in local state capacity, and the national 
state chooses the allocation of its employees across different areas to maximize its 
own objective.
We estimated the parameters of this model, which show large (but plausible) 
direct and spillover effects of local state capacity, using linear IV, GMM, or SMM. 
In all of our estimations, we exploited both the structure of the network of munici-
palities, determining which municipalities create spillovers on which others, and the 
historical roots of local state capacity as the source of exogenous variation for iden-
tifying both own and spillover effects. These are related to the presence of colonial 
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(Initial mean = 49%    Optimal mean = 51%)
Life quality index: initial (dark gray) versus optimal (light gray)
Panel A. Life quality index 
0 20 40 60 80 100
(Initial mean = 54%    Optimal mean = 58%)
Panel B. Public utilities coverage 
0 20 40 60 80 100
(Initial mean =  56%    Optimal mean = 59%)
Panel C. Percent not in poverty 
0 20 40 60 80 100
(Initial mean = 57%    Optimal mean = 63%)
Panel D. Secondary enrollment rate 
Figure 4. Change in the Distribution of Prosperity  
Following the Optimal Reallocation of Bureaucracy
Notes: The figure plots the predicted (light gray) empirical distributions for the four prosperity outcomes following 
the optimal reallocation of local state capacity (measured as the number of public employees), overlayed over the 
actual distributions (dark gray). Panel A presents the distributions for the life quality index in 1998. Panel B pres-
ents the distributions of the public utilities coverage (average of aqueduct, electricity, and sewage) in 2002. Panel C 
presents the distributions for the fraction of the population above the poverty line in 2005. Panel D presents the dis-
tributions for the average 1992–2002 secondary enrollment rate. 
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are unrelated to current provision of public goods and prosperity in a municipality 
and its neighbors, except through their impact on local state capacities.
Our estimates imply that local state presence is indeed a first-order determinant 
of current prosperity, but much of this impact works through network effects. For 
example, bringing all municipalities below median state capacity to the median, 
without taking into account equilibrium responses of other municipalities, would 
increase the median fraction of the population above the poverty line from  57 per-
cent to  60 percent. Approximately  57 percent of this is due to direct effects and 
43 percent due to spillovers. However, if we take the equilibrium responses of other 
municipalities into account, there are further network effects, reflecting the strate-
gic complementarities in local state capacity decisions. Once these adjustments are 
made, the median of the fraction of the population above poverty would increase 
to  68 percent—a much larger impact than the partial equilibrium effects. This indi-
cates not only that network effects are important, but also suggests why the national 
government must play a central role in effective state-building: local state-building 
will lead to major under-provision of state capacity (and thus public goods) because 
municipalities do not take into account these network effects.
We view our paper as a first step in the modeling and estimation of the direct and 
spillover effects of local state capacity. There are several interesting and important 
research directions. First, our results have focused only on some aspects of local 
state capacity. The typical view of the Weberian rational bureaucracy also stresses 
such things as meritocracy and predictability of the bureaucracy, which would be 
interesting to investigate at the local level as well. Second, and more importantly, we 
have not addressed another aspect of Weberian state capacity: the monopoly of vio-
lence. This is a central issue in Colombia, where the state often lacks this monopoly 
of violence. Third, our approach has been reduced-form in one crucial dimension: 
we have abstracted from political economy interactions. Though, we believe, this is 
reasonable as a first step, political economy factors are likely to be critical for the 
nature of some of these spillovers. In fact, we conjecture that underpinning the stra-
tegic complementarities documented in this paper is, in part, the pressure that high 
state capacity in one municipality puts on politicians in neighboring municipalities. 
Another important political economy dimension in the Colombian context is the 
control of politicians or armed groups over certain municipalities with very differ-
ent objectives, and their ability to do so may depend on outcomes in neighboring 
municipalities. Finally, an important next step would be to apply a similar approach 
to other settings in which law enforcement and policing are determined at the local 
level and create different types of spillovers on neighbors.
Appendix A
A. Slope of the Best Response Equation
Implicitly differentiating equation (7) with respect to  N i (δ)s yields
  
∂  l i  ______ ∂   N i (δ)s = ασ  
ϕ __θ  
1 _______________ 
(σ + 1) [  l i  __ s i ] 
 1 __σ − α [  l i  __ s i ] 
 .
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When  α = 1 ,  ∂   l i  _____ ∂   N i (δ)s =  
ϕ __θ . More generally, the denominator of this expression is 
strictly positive: this can be seen by noting that  (σ + 1) [  l i  _ s i ] 
 1 _σ − α [  l i  _ s i ] > 0 is equiv-
alent to
  σ + 1 >  α l i 
 σ−1 ____σ    ________________ 
α l i  σ−1 ____σ  + (1 − α) b i  σ−1 ____σ  
 ,
which is satisfied in view of the fact that  σ ≥ 0 and  α ∈ (0, 1) , and implies
  sign  ( ∂  l i  ______ ∂   N i (δ)s) = sign(ϕ) .
B. Optimal Reallocation of State Capacity
In the optimal reallocation problem, define  M ≡  (I −  ϕ __θ N(δ)) 
−1
 , and recall 
that for a given equilibrium vector of state capacities  s , equilibrium prosperity is 
given by
  p i j = θ s i 2 +  γ   j   N i  (δ)s +  x i   β ̃ +  ς ̃i D +  ϵ   i j . 
So the problem above can be rewritten as
   max 
e≥0 




   w i {θ [ M i ( 1 __θ κ + e) ] 
2
 +  _ γ  N i (δ)M ( 1 __θ κ + e) +  x i   β ̃ +  ς ̃i D +  ϵ   i j}  
   + λ (0 −  ∑ i 
 
   e i ) ,
where  λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint  ∑ i      e i = 0 , and  M i represents 
the  i th row of matrix  M . The first-order condition of this problem with respect to 
each  e t takes the form
  2 [ 1 N  Diag ( M t )  Mκ + θ 1 N  Diag ( M t )  Me] +  _ γ  1 N  N(δ) M t ′ −  λ ___  w t = 0, 
where  1 N is an  N × 1 row vector of 1s, and  Diag ( M t ) is an  N × N matrix with  M t 
in its diagonal and 0s off the diagonal. Thus we have a system of  N + 1 linear equa-
tions (the  N first-order conditions plus the budget constraint) with  N + 1 unknowns 
(the  N  e i s plus  λ ).
Define the scalar  g t ≡ 2 ·  1 N  Diag ( M t ) Mκ , and  g ≡ [ g 1 ,  g 2 , … ,  g N ]  ′ . Also 
define the scalar  h  t ≡  _ γ1 N  N(δ) M t ′, and  h ≡ [ h 1 ,  h  2 , … ,  h N ]  ′ . Finally define the 
1 × N vector  q t ≡ 2θ 1 N  Diag ( M t )  M , and  Q ≡  [ q 1 ′ ,  q 2 ′ , … ,  q N ′ ]  ′ . We can then 
express the  N first-order conditions in matrix form as:
  Qe −  w ̃ λ = −g − h ,
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 1 1 … 1 
   
− w ̃ 1 
 − w ̃ 2 . ..







  [  λ e  ] =  [ 0 −g − h ] .
Defining the matrix of the left-hand side as  B , the solution to this system is
(A1)  [  λ e  ] 
∗
 =  B −1 [ 0 −g − h ] .
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